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ABSTRACT
Keying  material  for  encryption  is  stored  as  digital  bistrings  in  non-volatile  memory 
(NVM) on FPGAs and ASICs in current technologies. However, secrets stored this way 
are not secure against a determined adversary, who can use probing attacks to steal the 
secret.  Physical  Unclonable  functions  (PUFs)  have  emerged  as  an  alternative.  PUFs 
leverage random manufacturing variations as the source of entropy for generating random 
bitstrings,  and incorporate  an  on-chip  infrastructure  for  measuring  and digitizing  the 
corresponding variations in key electrical parameters, such as delay or voltage. PUFs are 
vi
designed to reproduce a bitstring on demand and therefore eliminate the need for on-chip 
storage. 
In this dissertation, I propose a kind of PUF that measures resistance variations in 
inter-metal layers that define the power grid of the chip and evaluate its temperature and 
voltage stability. First, I introduce two implementations of a power grid-based PUF (PG-
PUF).  Then,  I  analyze  the  quality  of  bit  strings  generated  without  considering 
environmental variations from the PG-PUFs that leverage resistance variations in: 1) the 
power grid metal wires in 60 copies of a 90 nm chip and 2) in the power grid metal wires 
of 58 copies of a 65 nm chip. Next, I carry out a series of experiments in a set of 63 chips 
in IBM's 90 nm technology at 9 TV corners, i.e., over all combination of 3 temperatures: 
-40OC,  25OC  and  85OC  and  3  voltages:  nominal  and  +/-10% of  the  nominal  supply 
voltage. The randomness, uniqueness and stability characteristics of bitstrings generated 
from PG-PUFs are evaluated. The stability of the PG-PUF and an on-chip voltage-to-
digital (VDC)  are also evaluated at 9 temperature-voltage corners. 
I introduce several techniques that have not been previously described, including a 
mechanism to eliminate voltage trends or 'bias' in the power grid voltage measurements, 
as well as a voltage threshold, Triple-Module-Redundancy (TMR) and majority voting 
scheme to identify and exclude unstable bits.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
 1.1 Motivation
As electronic devices are becoming ubiquitous and interconnected around people's daily 
life, security, trustworthy computing, and privacy protection have emerged over the past 
decades  as  hardware  design  objectives  of  great  significance.  For  many  emerging 
applications that need exceptional security in identifying and authenticating users, such as  
intellectual  property  (IP)  protection,  system  security  is  traditionally  based  on  the 
protection of secret keys. Conventionally, these secret keys are based on battery-backed 
RAM or NVM such as ROMs, fuses, or flash/EEPROM. These secret keys need to be 
well  managed  and  stored  to  avoid  releasing  information  to  attackers.  Over  the  past 
several years, many kinds of attacks for exacting, estimating, or cloning secret keys that 
are stored digitally in NVM have been successfully developed and reported. When the 
adversaries  have  the  full  and  direct  access  to  ICs,  the  situation  is  getting  especially 
problematic and worse. Also, integrating a NVM for an IC incurs additional costs and 
fabrication overhead.
The described problem has become more intense recently, and this motivated the 
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idea of using inherent random manufacturing variations to serve as identifiers for ICs. It 
provides a promising alternative which can address the present challenges of traditional 
security that were described earlier. This idea is not new and a kind of circuits called 
Physical Unclonable Functions, which store secret keys in silicon circuits by exploiting 
uncontrollable randomness due to manufacturing process variations, have been proposed 
and successfully implemented to overcome some of the problems faced by traditional 
techniques.  PUFs  are  easy  to  build  and  can  be  implemented  without  any  additional 
manufacturing steps since they are based on the existing resources of physical variations 
of the IC. Due to the inherent properties and advantages of PUFs, the research of them 
has becoming more and more attractive in recent years.
 1.2 Introduction to PUFs
 When ICs are manufactured, there will  be inevitable inherent process difference even 
these ICs are fabricated from the same lot or wafer. Precise control over the fabrication of 
IC components is becoming more difficult in advanced technology generations, resulting 
in a wide range of electrical variations among and within the replicated copies of the 
chip. Due to the existing manufacturing process variations, it is difficult or impossible to 
create  two exact  ICs.  A PUF is  such an embedded structure that  are  designed to  be 
sensitive to variations in the printed and implanted features of wires and transistors on the 
IC. Signal variations that occur within the IC are the source of entropy for the PUF.
Usually,  the  physical  variations  of  manufacturing  process  manifest  as  analog 
variations  in  the  chips’ parametric  properties,  such  as  wire  delay,  threshold  voltage. 
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Therefore, a PUF is designed to measure and 'digitize' these analog electrical variations. 
When characterizing the PUF in a more understandable way, it can be considered as a 
function that maps challenges to responses.  The basic operation is  shown in Fig.  1.1: 
when a  Challenge (C) is  applied to the PUF, it reacts with a  Response (R). And the 
Challenge together with its associated response is known as Challenge-Response Pair 
(CRP). 
By  applying  a  set  of  'challenges'  to  the  PUF,  it  can  produce  a  large,  ideally 
exponential, set of unique bitstring, which can be considered as the fingerprint or DNA of 
a chip. Since the challenges are typically 'digital' and therefore they can be generated on-
chip from a pseudo-random number generator such as a linear feedback shift  register 
(LFSR).
Nothing in manufacturing process of a chip is exact, and therefore, all fabricated 
physical components,  e.g.,  wires and transistors,  on the chip vary from their nominal 
characteristics. Although it is possible to measure these physical variations directly, it is 
extremely difficult or impossible to do so without sophisticated process and equipment. 
The analog electrical  and parametric  variations  that result,  on the other hand, can be 
measured and processed more easily, and in many cases, this can be done using on-chip 
3
Fig. 1.1: CRP Protocol.
instrumentation.  Many  proposed  PUF-based  systems  are  defined  in  this  manner,  and 
differentiated by the type of electrical and/or parametric variations they leverage. The 
magnitude and stability of variations in, e.g., transient current delay, leakage, resistance, 
capacitance, etc. are dependent on the technology and environment, and therefore, some 
PUF systems can better meet the important criteria described above than others.
Due to the inherent and particular characteristics, PUFs are promising components 
in the next generation of IC security and the bitstring generated from PUFs can be used in 
security applications such as encryption, authentication, feature activation, metering, etc. 
Since  the bitstrings  are  generated  on-the-fly  using dedicated  hardware  primitives  and 
processing engines, and thereby avoid the need for storage in on-chip NVMs. This feature 
not only improves their resilience to invasive attacks designed to steal the secret key 
material, but it also reduces the cost of manufacturing the IC. The latter is true because, in 
many cases, PUFs are designed using components that can be fabricated using standard 
4
Fig. 1.2: The fingerprint of devices.
complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) processing steps, and therefore, the 
cost  of  integrating  non-standard  components,  such  as  NVM,  is  eliminated.  Another 
important  characteristic  of  the  PUF  as  a  next  generation  security  mechanism  is  its 
potential for generating large numbers of repeatable random bits. This feature offers new 
opportunities for software processes to strengthen security mechanisms, for example, by 
allowing  frequent  rekeying  in  encrypted  communication  channels  and  by  allowing  a 
large, changing set of shared keys to be utilized among multiple communicating entities. 
From  the  above  description  of  PUFs,  we  know  PUFs  can  provide  security 
advantages  over  traditional  key  generation mechanisms because  they are  volatile  and 
very  difficult  to  clone.  Unfortunately,  the  analog  nature  of  the  underlying  random 
variable make the PUF sensitive to environmental variations such as temperature and 
power supply noise. For some important applications such as keys for encryption, they 
require that the PUF must produce the same bit string for a fixed challenge under varying 
environment.  Therefore,  in  order  to  effectively  move  from  theoretical  exercises  to 
commercial  products,  the  'quality'  of  the  bitstring  produced can be  measured  against 
many statistical metrics, but needs to meet three important criteria: 1) the bit string is 
unique for each chip, and thereby able to distinguish each chip in the population, 2) the 
bit string is random for each chip, and therefore is difficult or impossible to model and 
predict by an adversary, and 3) the bit string is stable, i.e., it remains constant for a given 
chip over time, and under varying environmental conditions. A PUF that is able to meet 
these  requirements  can  be  used  in  applications  related  to  security  including  system 
identification,  key  generation  for  encryption,  authentication  via  CRPs,  IP protection, 
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remote service etc.
In this  dissertation,  Inter-chip hamming distance  (HD) is  used to  determine the 
uniqueness  of  the  bitstrings  among  the  population  of  chips.  Similarly,  the  National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical test suite is used to evaluate the 
randomness of the bitstrings produced by each chip. And intra-chip HD can be used to 
evaluate stability of the bitstrings, i.e., the ability of each chip to reproduce the same 
bitstring time-after-time, under varying temperature and voltage conditions.
 1.3 Contributions
In this dissertation, I investigate two implementations of a PUF that measures resistance 
variations in metal wires that define the power grid of the chip, and we call it PG-PUF. 
There are several benefits of the PG-PUF. First, resistance of metal wires varies linearly 
with  temperature and can easily  be  designed to  be  resistant  to  aging effects  such as 
electromigration. Second, resistance can be measured using a simple direct current (DC) 
process,  which  can  improve  signal-to-noise  significantly  over  PUFs  that  leverage 
alternating  current  (AC)  characteristics,  such  s  delay.  Third,  metal  components  are 
ubiquitous  on  a  chip,  with  the  power  grid  consuming  a  large  fraction  of  the  metal 
resources, e.g., 15-25% is typical in most commercial power grid designs. Fourth, the 
power grid is a stacked structure, offering a 3rd dimension in which to leverage entropy. 
Last,  the  interconnected  structure  of  the  wires  in  the  power  grid  complicates  the 
interaction among variations in resistance that occur, thereby increasing the complexity 
of model building attacks.
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In  order  to  fully  leverage  metal  resistance  variations,  I  design  a  PUF that  can 
measure them in each of the metal layers of the power grid. In order to reduce bias issues 
and  correlations  that  exist  in  the  VDD and  GND  grids,  inter-metal  layer  voltage 
drops/rises, which are computed by subtracting the voltages measured from consecutive 
metal layers, are introduced. By this method, the independent resistance variations that 
occur in each of the metal layers of the power grid can be leveraged.
First, the experiments are carried out on a set of chips fabricated in IBM's 90nm, 9 
metal layer bulk silicon process, and on a set of 65 nm chips fabricated in IBM's silicon-
on-insulator  (SOI)  process  at  room  temperature.  The  quality  of  the  bit  strings  are 
evaluated  using  inter-chip  and  intra-chip  HD,  as  well  as  a  suite  of  statistical  tests 
available from NIST [1]. 
Then, I focus on determining the temperature and voltage (TV) stability of the PG-
PUF. A significant benefit of using metal structure is that “noise-related” variations, such 
as those introduced by TV variations, result in linear changes to the measured voltages. 
This linear scaling characteristic allows the relative magnitude of two voltages to remain 
consistent  across  changes  in  temperature  and  voltage,  which,  in  turn,  improves  the 
stability of the PUF to bit-flips, when compared for example to PUFs which leverage 
transistor-based variations. In the experiments, I evaluate the PG-PUF at 9 TV corners, i. 
e., over all combinations of 3 temperatures; -40oC, 25oC, 85oC, and 3 voltages; nominal 
and +/-10% of nominal. The evaluation is carried out on a set of chips fabricated in IBM's 
90 nm, 9 metal layer bulk silicon bulk silicon process. The stability of the bitstring is 
measured using intra-chip HD and 'probability of failure' techniques. Randomness and 
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uniqueness are also evaluated using NIST test suite and inter-chip HD methods. 
I  also  investigate  an  on-chip  voltage-to-digital  converter  (VDC)  for  measuring 
voltage variations (which reflect resistance variations in the metal wires) and its stability 
across the 9 TV corners. The VDC is used to digitize the voltage drops produced from 
each metal layer of the power grid.
Besides, I introduce several noise resilient bit-flip avoidance schemes, which are 
used to reduce the probability of a failure to reproduce the bitstring to less than 1E-9 
under varying environmental variations. One technique is called thresholding mechanism, 
which derives a voltage threshold from a chip's voltage drop distribution profile that is 
used to decide whether a given voltage comparison generate a strong bit or a weak bit. 
The second scheme is a bitstring replication method that mimics a popular scheme used 
in fault tolerance called Triple-Module-Redundancy (TMR). TMR is proposed for fixed-
length bitstrings that can further improve the stability of the bitstrings. Although these 
techniques discard a large fraction of bits, they provide several advantages and can be 
used as an alternative to error correction and Helper Data schemes [2][3]. The helper data 
(public data)  associated with these methods reveals nothing about  the secret  bitstring 
since every bit is independent from others. Also, the helper data is simple data for both of 
these  techniques  and  its  size  can  be  easily  reduced  by  using  a  certain  compression 
technique. What's more, these methods increase the difficulty of model-building since 
bitstrings are constructed using only a subset of the possible voltage pairings. However, 
for  error  correction  scheme,  the  complex  algorithm  implementation  will  require 
significant  resources and overhead.  And also the error  correction scheme will  release 
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some  secret  information.  Therefore,  both  the  thresholding  and  TMR  are  easier  and 
cheaper to implement on chip when compared with the error correction schemes. That's 
the main reason  we avoid using the error correction scheme to fix unstable bits issues for 
PUFs.  In  this  dissertation,  both  techniques are  demonstrated  to  provide  a  significant 
improvement to inter-chip HD and the results obtained from NIST statistical tests. 
 1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows: 
In  Chapter  1,  the  motivation of  using PUFs for  security  applications  is  briefly 
described. Then the basic idea of PUFs and their advantages over conventional methods 
are given. Finally, the requirements for PUFs in order to be used for practical security 
applications and some methods of evaluating the quality of them are discussed.
In  Chapter  2,  the  development  of  definition  for  PUFs  are  described.  Then the 
previous work about PUFs and classification of the popular PUFs are covered. Also, the 
applications of PUFs are discussed. Besides, several statistical methods for evaluating the 
quality  of  bitstrings  generated  from  PG-PUFs  are  briefly  described.  Finally,  some 
techniques used to improve the stability of PUFs are given.
In  Chapter 3, two implementations of PG-PUFs for both IBM 90 nm and 60 nm 
technologies  are  introduced  and  experiments  are  carried  out  without  considering 
environmental variations. The output bitstrings are analyzed and evaluated by using inter-
chip HD, intra-chip HD and NIST tests suite. 
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In Chapter 4, experiments are carried out across different temperatures and voltages 
in order to evaluate the stability of PG-PUFs against environmental variations. Several 
methods  of  improving  the  stability  of  PG-PUFs  are  demonstrated.  The  quality  of 
bitstrings are also evaluated using statistical tests.
In Chapter 5, some future work is proposed.
Finally, the findings and contributions of this dissertation are concluded.
10
Chapter 2 
Background
Study on manufacturing process variations and PUFs has been gaining increasing interest 
and attention since  the  concept  of  PUFs was firstly  introduced in  [4].  Over  the past 
couple of years, the attention on PUFs has risen substantially, making them a hot topic in 
the field of hardware security and leading to an expansion of published results.  This 
chapter will provide an overview of PUFs. The basic definition will be given in Section 
 2.1,  different  types  of  PUFs  will  be  classified  in  Section 2.3,  many  important 
applications will be discussed in Section  2.4. At the end of this chapter, several methods 
used for evaluating the quality  of PUFs will  be listed.  And many techniques used to 
improve the stability of PUFs are also discussed.
 2.1 Definition of PUFs
It  is  widely  accepted  that  the  significance  and  complexity  of  process  variations  is 
increasing  as  technologies  are  aggressively  scaled  [5][6].  The  idea  of  using  these 
manufacturing process variations as identifiers for ICs has showed up for a long time. 
However, the concept of PUFs didn't appear until recent years. There have already been 
several proposals for the definition of required PUF properties. Firstly, they were called 
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Physical One-Way Function  [4], and later renamed to Physical Random Functions  [7], 
but eventually resolved to Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). The exact definition 
for this kind of circuits is still under discussion. The most popular definition of PUFs is 
described in [8] by Gassend et al.:
 “A physical Random Function (PUF) is a function that maps challenges to responses that 
is embodied by a physical device, and that verifies the following properties:
• Easy  to  evaluate:  The  physical  device  is  easily  capable  of  evaluating  the 
function in a short amount of time.
• Hard  to  predict:  From  a  polynomial  number  of  plausible  physical 
measurements, an attacker who no longer has the device, and who can only 
use a polynomial amount of resources can only extract a negligible amount of 
information about the responses to a random chosen challenge.”
There are also other descriptions of PUFs, e.g., in  [9], the authors described that 
“Physical Unclonable Functions consist of inherently unclonable physical systems. They 
inherit their unclonability from the fact that they consist of many random components 
that are present in the manufacturing process and cannot be controlled. When a stimulus 
is applied to the system, it reacts with a response”.
 2.2 PUF Extensions
From the  description  in  section 1.2,  we  know that  PUF is  a  function  that  can  map 
challenges to responses. Therefore,  according to how many CRPs different PUFs can 
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generate  with  the  same hardware  resources,  there are  two different  situations:  strong 
PUFs and weak PUFs.  Usually,  Strong PUFs can produce an  exponential  number of 
CRPs which are more difficult for attackers to model and learn, while weak PUFs only 
have a linear number of them. Besides trying to generate as many CRPs as possible, 
people have also developed some other methods to increase the security of PUFs. Some 
people use pre-processing or post-processing schemes to obtain more robust bitstrings. 
Some people combine PUFs with a particular algorithm which can make model-building 
attacks more difficult. In the following part, I will discuss more details on how to obtain 
these improvements.
 2.2.1  Controlled PUFs
The concept of Controlled PUFs or (CPUFs) was introduced by Gassend et al. in  [2], 
which combine a PUF with other primitives. The CPUFs can only be accessed via an 
algorithm that is physically bound to the PUF in an inseparable way, and any attempt to 
break the link between the PUF and the algorithm will definitely lead to the destruction 
of the PUF. Therefore, by using controls to the PUFs, it is possible to make a PUF more 
robust and reliable. In  [7], the authors summarized several controls that can be placed 
around the PUF to improve its function. Fig. 2.1 shows the full details of these controls. 
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Fig. 2.1: Using controls to improve a PUF[7].
 2.2.2  Reconfigurable PUFs
In 2009, the authors in [10] defined a new primitive, called reconfigurable PUF (rPUF). 
The rPUF is a PUF with a mechanism, which can transform the original PUF into a new 
PUF  with  a  new  unpredictable  and  uncontrollable  challenge-response  behavior. 
Meanwhile, the rPUF can still preserve all the security properties of the original PUF. In 
this literature, two practical instantiations of rPUFs were presented. One is based on the 
optical PUF. When the structure of the optical PUF is irradiated with a laser beam outside 
the normal operating conditions, the structure will change its internal configuration. This 
change will cause a rearrangement of the optical scatters, which will lead to a completely 
new random CRP behavior. Another is based on phase change memory. By rewriting the 
memory cells, a new random CRPs can also be generated .
Later in 2011, more novel structures of the reconfigurable PUFs were discussed in 
[11]. The first method is adding reconfigurable elements before the challenges applied to 
the PUF, while the original properties and performance of the PUF will still be preserved; 
another idea is to add extra reconfigurable components to process the output before using 
it as an authentication key. The authors in the literature also stated that instead of only 
making CPRs reconfigurable by processing the challenge and responses directly, they can 
also alter the main PUF circuit to update the challenge-response behavior.
 2.3 PUF Implementations
Since the introduction of concept of PUFs, many studies on PUFs have been reported. 
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There have been a large variety of PUF implementations, and the list still keeps getting 
larger. In this section, I will mainly discuss the following several types of PUFs: 1) Non-
electronic PUF. (2) Delay-based PUF. (3) Memory-based PUF. (4) Power-grid PUF. 5) 
Misc Category.
 2.3.1  Non-Electronic PUFs
An earlier  non-electronic PUF is  a so-called optical PUF  [4],  which use microscopic 
refractive glass spheres in a small transparent epoxy plate. It is stimulated using a helium-
neon laser and the speckle pattern represents the response. The basic implementation and 
operation of an optical PUF is shown in Fig. 2.2 [12]. It is obvious that the optical PUF 
has a really complex structure and therefore cannot be used for large scale production. 
In [13], the authors introduced a technique which can make use of the reflection of 
a focused laser beam by the irregular fiber structure of a paper document. The particular 
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Fig. 2.2: Basic operation of an optical PUF [12].
pattern of the reflection can be used as fingerprint of that paper and therefore can be used 
as anti-counterfeiting strategy for currency notes. In  [14], the authors proposed a new 
technique for exacting unique fingerprints from identical CDs. It was observed that the 
manufacturing  variations  of  the  lengths  of  lands  and pits  on  a  regular  CD are  large 
enough to be measured from the electrical signal of the photodetector in a regular CD 
player. In [15],  a kind of PUFs called magnetic PUFs were introduced, which use the 
inherent uniqueness of the particular patterns in magnetic media, e.g., for credit  cards. 
Other non-electronic PUFs including RF-DNA [16] and acoustical PUFs [17] were also 
proposed. 
 2.3.2  Delay-Based PUFs
Delay-based  PUFs  utilize  the  variations  in  propagation  delay  of  identical  circuits  to 
derive a secret response. There are mainly two popular types of delay-based PUFs: arbiter 
PUFs and ring oscillator (RO) PUFs. 
The basic idea of the arbiter  PUF was proposed in  [18][19], which exploits the 
statistical delay variations of wires and transistors across ICs to introduce a digital race 
condition on two paths on a chip and to be implemented with an arbiter to decide which 
path won the race. The basic structure of the arbiter PUFs is  shown in Fig.  2.3. In this 
structure, a sequence of switches is connected in series and each of them is controlled by 
one bit of the challenge. At the end, an arbiter decides which path is faster and assigns a 
digital '1' or '0' accordingly. In real world, the two delay paths are 'lay-out' in an identical 
fashion.  However,  due  to  the  uncontrollable  manufacturing  processing  variations,  the 
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delays of these two delay paths vary randomly across different chips, which can allow the 
generation of unique responses for every IC.
From the structure of the arbiter PUF, it is known that the total delay of the chain 
should be the sum of the delay of the separate blocks.  Therefore,  the arbiter  PUF is 
susceptible to model-building attacks. By observing a number of CPRs, the attackers can 
build a mathematical model of the PUF that predicts the response to an unseen challenge. 
In order to make the model-building attacks to the arbiter PUF more difficult, in [19], a 
feed-forward arbiter PUF was depicted as shown in Fig.  2.4. In this structure, multiple 
challenge bits are determined by the racing result in intermediate stages instead of being 
provided by a user as that for the basic arbiter PUFs  [8][18]. Since the internal feed-
forward bits are hidden to an adversary, it is difficult to build a precise model of a feed-
forward arbiter PUF.
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Fig. 2.3: Basic operation of an arbiter PUF [12]
However, experimental results from literatures [20] show that with more advanced 
modeling techniques it is still possible to build an accurate model for the feed-forward 
arbiter PUF. More advanced architectures were proposed in [11][21]. In [21], the authors 
developed a new set of techniques for FPGA-based PUF design and implementation, 
which use reconfigurable structure to eliminate some of the classical arbiter-based PUF 
limitations and make them more resistant to modeling.
Also,  note  that  arbiters  in  practice  are  implemented by D flip-flops.  When  the 
absolute delay difference of the arriving signals is smaller than its setup and hold time, 
which results in metastability and high sensitivity to environmental variations. In order to 
solve these problems, Devadas et al. in [22] introduced a new arbiter-based PUF structure 
that exploits programmable delay lines (PDL) to tune and cancel out the delay skews 
caused by asymmetries in routing on FPGAs. The authors in this literature also stated that 
there is still other direction of improving the security of arbiter-based PUFs, which is by 
reducing noise probability in PUF responses. Further,  a PDL-based symmetric  switch 
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Fig.2.4: Feed-forward arbiter scheme for improved security [19].
structure was also introduced to resolve the routing issues. 
Another type of delay-based PUFs is called Ring-Oscillator PUF (RO-PUF). The 
basic structure of a RO-PUF is proposed in [7] as shown in Fig. 2.5. An AND gate in the 
loop allows to enable/disable the oscillation. As introduced in  [7], the RO-PUF uses a 
different  approach  towards  measuring  small  random  delay  deviations  caused  by 
manufacturing  variability.  The  source  of  this  randomness  is  again  the  uncontrollable 
effect of process variations on the delay of digital components. The basic idea of RO-
PUF is to connect the output of the delay chain (that for the Arbiter PUFs) to the input 
and measure the frequency (instead of delay). 
      
However, the RO-PUF suffers from the systematic or correlated process variation 
and the environmental  noise caused by the voltage and temperature variations, which 
degrade the uniqueness and the stability of PUF responses  [12]. There have been many 
effective solutions trying to improve the performance of RO-PUFs [23][24][25]. In [23], 
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Fig.2.5: Basic Ring-Oscillator PUF circuit proposes in [7].
the authors presented a temperature-ware cooperative RO-PUF implementation to reduce 
the hardware cost. In [24], Maiti et al. proposed a compensation method to mitigate the 
negative influence  of  systematic  process variations.  The method is  as follows:  firstly 
place the group of ring oscillators as close as possible to each other, and secondly pick 
the  physically  adjacent  pair  of  ROs  while  evaluating  a  responses  bit.  Also,  they 
introduced a novel configurable ring oscillator technique, which can drastically reduce 
the effect of noise on PUF responses. In [26], Mansouri et al. introduced a new type of 
RO-PUF. In this structure, the inverters composing the ring oscillators can be supplied by 
independent voltages. The authors stated that this basic concept can be used to design 
temperature-aware  RO-PUFs,  whose  output  bits  do  not  depend  on  the  operating 
temperature. Therefore, the reliability of the PUF is improved to temperature variations.
Also, an improved RO-PUF called reconfigurable PUF with a mechanism to update 
its challenge-Response pairs was proposed in [10]. This PUF preserves the properties of 
original PUF but has unpredictably different challenge-Response behaviors after every 
reconfiguration. 
For  all  the  delay-based  PUFs,  they  are  based  on  the  delay  variations  and 
propagation  time  comparison  or  rings  oscillator  frequency  comparisons.  There  exist 
contest that these delays or frequencies are too similar to decide the response. Based on 
this contest,  the Grenoble INP team in  [27] developed a PUF based on asynchronous 
communication in order to generate violation depending of flip-flop set-up time. When a 
synchronous design does not respect the setup time, this can induce metastability in the 
circuit (a  “quasi-stable” state which will be resolved either  by '0' state or by '1' state in 
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an undefined time).
Besides these two popular types of delay-based PUFs, in [28],  a new delay-based 
PUF architecture called glitch PUF was proposed, which exploits glitches that behave 
non-linearly  from  delay  variation  between  gates  and  the  characteristic  of  pulse 
propagation  of  each  gate.  The  authors  presented  a  method  to  accurately  acquire  the 
waveforms and to convert them into response bits  and also evaluate the characteristics of 
glitch PUF. This structure is expected to solve the current problem of delay-based PUF 
that  it  is  easy  to  predict  the  relation  between  delay  information  and  generated 
information.
 2.3.3  Memory-Based PUFs
In this section, another popular type of PUFs that leverage the bi-stability characteristics 
of memory primitives will be listed. It is implemented by putting a memory cell into an 
metastable state and then releasing it. In most cases, digital memory cells heavily prefer 
one of the two stable states. However, in some cases, meta-stability results, which results 
in  oscillations  between  stable  states  and  non-deterministic  settling  times.There  have 
shown several  kinds  of  memory-based PUFs such as  Static  Random-Access  Memory 
(SRAM) PUFs [29][30][31], Butterfly PUFs [32], Flip-flop PUFs [33], Latch PUFs [34]. 
In  [29], the authors provided the first construction of an intrinsic PUF based on 
SRAM memory randomness. The typical SRAM PUF is implemented with six transistors 
(MOSFETs) as shown in Fig.  2.6, and formed of two cross-coupled inverters and two 
access transistors connecting to the data bit-lines based on the word-line signal. In the 
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same year, a very similar concept was also presented in [30].
                      
       
Later in the year of 2008, the authors of [32] proposed a new PUF structure called 
Butterfly PUF that can be used on all types of FPGAs. The structure of the butterfly PUF 
is as shown in Fig.2.7,  constructed as symmetrically as possible by manual routing of the 
signal wires. It consists of two latches, each with a preset signal and a clear signal. The 
data signal is transferred to the output when the CLK is high.  The stable state of the 
butterfly PUF depends on the slight differences in the delays of the connecting wires 
which are designed using symmetrical paths on the FPGA matrix.
The  authors  in  [35] introduced  an  SRAM PUF which  they  implemented  on  a 
microcontroller using the internal SRAM block. In [33], the authors proposed a so-called 
flip-flops  PUF,  which  is  based  on  the  power-up  behavior  of  regular  flip-flops.  The 
experimental results in this literature show that this flip-flop PUFs is equivalent to the 
previous proposed SRAM PUFs. The authors stated that the flip-flops PUFs have some 
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Fig.2.6: Six transistor SRAM cell [29].
advantages with regard to the use in reconfigurable devices. 
In [36], the authors presented detailed evaluations of 90 nm 6T-SRAM as PUF for 
secure key generation in wireless sensor nodes. In order to put SRAM PUF in low-power 
security applications, a design for using a 65 nm 10T sub-threshold SRAM as a PUF was 
proposed  in  [37].  In  this  design,  significant  improvements  are  achieved  in  power 
consumption  and  security  over  existing  designs.  Experimental  results  show that  this 
design is suitable for ultra-low power security applications since it have more than 50% 
of uniqueness and near 100% reliability with a 60% of power saving.
These memory-based PUFs are reasonably resistant to model-attacks compared to 
the delay-Based PUFs as their responses are based on independent random elements. But 
the memory-based PUFs grow with overheads (size) exponentially related to the length of 
their challenges.       
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Fig.2.7: Butterfly PUF: cross-coupled latches[32].
 2.3.4  Power Grid-Based PUFs
The power grid-based PUF (PG-PUF) was firstly proposed in [38], which is based on the 
resistance variations in the power grid of a chip. There are two strategies for the PG-
PUFs in this paper: one is based on voltage drops, and another is based on equivalent 
resistance. Voltage drops and equivalent resistances in the power distribution system are 
measured  using  external  instruments  and  it  is  again  observed  that  these  electrical 
parameters are affected by random manufacturing variability. 
The  authors  in  [38] also  stated that  there  are  many  advantages  using  process 
variations of power grid as PUFs. Firstly, the PG-PUFs is based on the variations in only 
passively  components  of  the  IC,  specifically  the  power  grid,  and  is  therefore  less 
susceptible to environmental variations. Secondly, because the power grid is an existing 
distributed resource in every design, the overhead of the PG-PUFs is lower than other 
kind of PUFs.          
 2.3.5  Misc Category
In the  year of  2011,  many novel  PUFs showed up  [39][40][41][42][43].  In  [39],  the 
authors  presented  PUF  circuits  designed  to  exploit  inherent  fluctuations  in  physical 
layout, called litho-PUFs. Variations arising from proximity effects, density effects, etch 
effects,  and non-rectangularity  of  transistors  are  leveraged  to  implement  lithography-
based  PUFs.  And  the  authors  showed  that  the  uniqueness  level  of  these  PUFs  are 
adjustable and are typically much higher than traditional ring-oscillator or tri-state buffer 
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based approaches. In  [40], the authors proposed a PUF called PE-PUF. This PUF takes 
into account process variations, temperature, power supply noise and crosstalk, which are 
major sources of variations and noise in ICs. In [41], the authors introduced a new class 
of  dynamic  PUF  (DPUF)  that  employs  dynamic  system  alteration  with  respect  to 
individual gate speeds, enabling each user to create his own PUF as needed. The authors 
stated that this DPUF has very high unpredictability and can easily be stabilized. The 
authors in [42] presented a PUF called Bi-stable Ring PUF. The basic idea of it is based 
on  the  fact  that  an  inverter  ring  consisting  of  an  even number  of  inverters  has  two 
possible stable states. The PUF proposed in [43] is built using leakage sensors with each 
measuring  the  leakage  current  of  a  transistor.  When  compared  with  a  popular  ring 
oscillator PUF architecture of the same entropy, the authors stated that this proposed PUF 
consumes about 80% less power, occupies about 85% less area, and has a high level of 
stability across a wide range of temperature. Very recently, the authors in  [44] used the 
Buskeeper as a PUF, and gave experimental results showing that the Buskeeper PUF can 
be considered as a good alternative to D flip-flop PUFs since the Buskeeper PUF are 
much more efficient  than D flip-flops in regard to the amount of hardware resources 
required while they can maintain the performance as well as the already and generally 
accepted ones. In  [45], J. Aarestad et al.  introduced a new PUF called the Hardware-
Embedded Delay PUF, or HELP, which leverages the natural variations that occur in the 
path delays of a core micro on a chip to create an unique, stable, and random bistring of 
virtually any length.
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 2.4 Applications of PUF
PUFs have shown great promise in many security applications such as IC identification 
[7][46][47][48], generating unique keys for encryption  [49][50], authentication  [8][47]
[51][52], IP protection on FPGAs [32], RFID for anti-counterfeiting [53].
The  unclonability  property  makes  PUFs  attractive  for  supporting  anti-
counterfeiting  technologies,  in  the  biometric  sense.  Therefore,  PUFs  can  be  used  to 
identify and authenticate a chip. The process works by the following steps: at time '0'  
(after manufacturing), a trusted entity applies a process called enrollment phase. In this 
phase,  a  subset  of  challenges  are  applied  from the  much larger  number of  available 
challenges and the challenge-Response pairs (CPRs) are stored in a secure database. This 
database need to be securely managed by the trusted party, only who has knowledge of 
which challenges are applied; later in the field, during the authentication process, the 
trusted party apply a challenge and then check whether the response is close enough to 
that in the database. After the use of the CPRs, it needs to be removed from the database 
in order to avoid information release to attackers.
Secret keys are essential and important to many security applications such as IP 
protection and software licensing as well as conventional ID cards and smart cards. The 
response  bitstrings  of  PUFs  are  proposed  to  integrate  secret  keys  for  the  use  in 
cryptography.  When compared to  the  conventional  methods  of  storing  secret  keys  in 
NVM, PUFs have some additional security against probing and side-channel attacks: 1) 
PUFs do not require a key-programming step, as is true of conventional methods; 2) the 
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secret key is not generated and stored in volatile memory until it's needed. Usually, the 
response  bitstrings  of  PUFs  cannot  be  directly  used  as  secret  key  due  to  the 
environmental noise such as temperature and supply voltage. Therefore, an intermediate 
processing step is required to extract a crypto key from the responses of PUFs. I will  
describe several  of the popular methods used to decrease or remove the noise in the 
output bitstrings of PUFs in Section  2.7.
          In recent years, Intellectual Property (IP) protection of FPGA hardware designs has 
gaining more attention  and becoming a requirement for many IP vendors. In  [54], the 
authors explained why PUFs can be a very valuable technology to protect a company's IP 
and present several cryptographic algorithms and protocols to use them in IP protection 
applications. In [29][49], new protocols are introduced for the IP protection problem on 
FPGAs based on public-key cryptography. In  [32], the authors introduced the Butterfly 
PUF and stated that it promises to be a significantly secure way to protect IP with no 
additional costs in manufacturing. 
          In [55][53] , the authors stated that in order to make Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) tags resistant against many attacks, they can be linked to PUFs inseparably. The 
authors  demonstrated  that  PUFs  can securely  authenticate  an  RFID  with  minimal 
overheads. The authors also stated the PUF-based unclonable RFIDs can be used in anti-
counterfeiting and security applications. 
 2.5 Performance Metrics of PUFs 
In order to apply PUFs in security applications such as encryption key storage, unique 
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device identifiers,  they should possess several properties that determine the quality of 
bitstrings generated by these PUFs.  Mainly,  there are three characteristics to evaluate 
their performance. They are uniqueness, stability and randomness.     
 2.5.1  Uniqueness
This characteristic is used to evaluate how much one chip is different from one another. It 
is the basis for PUFs to serve as identifiers. The inter-chip HD will be applied to evaluate 
the uniqueness and decide how many PUF output bits are different from other PUFs. The 
histogram of  the  inter-chip  HD can  be  characterized  as  a  Gaussian  distribution  and 
summarized using an average value of μinter. The ideal inter-chip HD is 50%. Usually, the 
evaluation  results  of  proposed  PUFs  cannot  achieve  the  ideal  uniqueness.  Some 
publications  have  been focused  on how to  improve the  uniqueness,  e.g.  in  [56],  the 
authors proposed a  novel arbitration scheme called Response Generation according to 
Delay Time Measurement (RG-DTM), which divide the delay-time differences at regular 
interval and decide the response by the time domains of the interleaved response 0 and 1. 
In  [57],  the  authors  proposed  an  arbiter-based  PUF  circuit  built  on  current  starved 
inverters, whose drain currents are set by local current mirrors. This circuit  amplifies 
process  variations  that  result  in  great  uniqueness  when  compared  against  a  simple 
inverter chain. The experimental results in this literature show superior performance in 
uniqueness and reliability.
 2.5.2  Stability (Reproducibility)
When repeatedly applying the same challenge to a PUF, ideally, the responses should 
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keep the  same.  Also,  when PUFs  are  used  in  practical  implementations  they  can  be 
subjected to all kinds of environmental variations such as temperature, varying supply 
voltages and different voltage ramp-up curves. To my knowledge, there is no PUF that 
can avoid the 'bit flip' problem, and it must be dealt with before PUFs can be used for 
encryption applications. The intra-chip HD will be used to evaluate the stability of output 
bitstrings generated from PUFs.
         In most literatures, the authors applied error correction or helper data schemes to  
gain good reliability [2][3]. However, the overhead associated with these blocks increase 
very quickly with increasing error correction capability and can become prohibitively 
large for many applications. Also, these schemes require additional helper or syndrome 
bits to be publicly stored, which may leak information. Recently, several new reliability 
improvement methods have been presented. In  [58], the authors proposed an effective 
method  of  regenerating  a  finite  and  exact  sequence  of  bits,  which  exposes  response 
patterns  and keeps  secret  the  particular  challenge that  generate  response  patters.  The 
experimental results show that this method can efficiently and reliably generate bitstrings 
under extreme environmental variations.
        Later in 2012, Bhargava et al. demonstrated 3 reliability enhancing techniques for 
bi-stable PUF designs: directed accelerated aging (DAA), multiple evaluations (MA) and 
activation control (AC)  [59].  From the measured results  in this  literature,  these three 
techniques are able to reduce the percentage of unreliable bits by up to 40%, 83%, and 
71% respectively. 
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 2.5.3  Randomness
Besides  uniqueness  and stability  described above,  it  is  also  important  to  analyze  the 
randomness of  output  bitstrings generated from PUFs.  Here,  the  NIST tests suite  are 
applied to test the randomness of them. In [60], the authors used the NIST tests suite to 
evaluate the randomness of output strings for PUFs, resulting in excellent raw material 
for key generation and for authentication. In [61], the authors stated that the amount of 
randomness  in  the  PUF  output  could  be  a  significant  limitation.  They  introduced  a 
method of passing the PUF response to a shift-register, and discover that the randomness 
of  the  PUF output  could be greatly  increased while  maintaining reliability.  Also,  the 
authors showed experimental results that authentication with the shifted response data is 
superior to that with non-shifted data.
 2.6 Evaluation Methods of PUFs
 2.6.1   Hamming Distance
In order to evaluate the uniqueness and stability for a PUF implementation, HD has been 
introduced to measure these metrics. The test analyzes the relationship between CRPs' 
HD for each PUF. The inter-chip HD and intra-chip HD are introduced to evaluate these 
two metrics of PUF realizations. In order to study the statistical behavior of PUFs, all 
inter-chip  and  intra-chip  HD  measurements  are  often  combined  and  summarized  as 
histograms.  In  many  cases,  the  HD  histograms  can  be  characterized  as  a  Gaussian 
distribution and summarized using a μinter and μintra and a σinter and σintra . 
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       For a particular challenge, the inter-chip HD between two different PUF instanti-
ations is the distance between the two responses, resulting from applying this challenge 
simultaneously to both different PUFs. The inter-chip HD, when expressed as a fraction, 
the ideal value is 50%, i.e., half of the bits are different on average.
        For a particular challenge, the intra-chip HD between two measurements on the 
same  PUF  instantiation is  the  distance  between  the  two  responses,  resulting  from 
applying this challenge twice to the same PUF. Intra-chip HD is strongly tied to random 
noise and systematic environment variations,  such as those introduced by temperature 
and supply voltage. The intra-chip HD expresses the average noise in the response, and 
reflects reproducibility. When expressed as a fraction, the ideal value is 0%, i.e., the bit 
string can be reliably regenerated across different environmental conditions.
 2.6.2  NIST SUITE
The National Institution of Standards and Technology (NIST) test suite is regarded as an 
industrial standard to test cryptographic random number generator (RNGs) and recently 
has been widely used to evaluate the randomness of bitstrings generated by PUFs  [62]
[63]. The NIST Test Suite has totally 15 tests [1], including Frequency Test, Frequency 
Test within a Block, Runs Test, Longest Run of ones in a Block, Binary Matrix Rank 
Test,  Discrete  Fourier  Transform  Test,  Non-overlapping  Template  Matching  Test, 
Overlapping  Template  Matching  Test,  Maurer's  “Universal  Statistical”  Test,  Linear 
Complexity Test, Serial Test, Approximate Entropy Test, Cumulative Sums Test, Random 
Excursions Test. For many of them, it is assumed the bit sequence is large, on order of 
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103 to 107. Therefore, parameters are chosen according to NIST recommendations, e.g., 
the length of bit sequence n>100 for Frequency Test, n>38,912 for Binary Matrix Rank 
Test, block length M=32 for Block Frequency Test, block length m=2 for approximate 
Entropy test and block length m=5 for Serial Test.
 2.7 Techniques of Improving the Stability of PUFs
 2.7.1  Threshold Mechanism
For some PUFs, the response bit is generated by comparing two analog values such as 
delay  and voltage.  When  the  compared two values  are  very  similar,  there  exists  the 
possibility that they maybe cause bit flipping due to the environmental variations. For 
example, in the first measurement, value1>value2; however, due to the small difference 
of  these  two  compared  values  and  the  environmental  variations,  in  the  second 
measurement,  it  is  possible that value1<value2. In this  case,  the bit  generated by the 
PUFs is considered as an unstable bit. The bistrings produced from PUFs can not be used 
in the application of encryption if they contains unstable bits. As we know, people usually 
use the error correction and Helper Data to deal with the bit-flipping problems of PUFs. 
However, due to the additional overhead and possibility of leaking information of these 
schemes, a 'threshold' mechanism can be setup and used as an alternative to deal with the 
'bit-flips'  to  improve  the  stability  of  output  bitstrings.  According  to  the  idea  of  the 
'threshold' mechanism, when applying each challenge to PUFs and comparing two analog 
values,  the  bits  generated  by  those  that  are  less  than  the  threshold  values  will  be 
discarded.
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         Therefore, the threshold mechanism should serve several primary goals: 1) it needs 
to avoid bit-flipping under different environmental noise; 2) it also needs to preserve as 
many strong bits as possible for each chip; 3) it should make the number of strong bits 
consistent across chip.
 2.7.2   Majority Voting and TMR
Majority voting is a mechanism that the final result is decided  according to the majority, 
that is , more than half the votes. For our PUF experiments, majority voting is the process 
of collecting multiple measurements through repeatedly sampling, and determining one 
output bit based on the individual value of the single measurement. 
I also use a technique called Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [64] to improve 
the stability of the output bitstrings. The basic principle of the TMR is fault-tolerant form 
of  N-modular  redundancy,  in  which  three  system perform process  and  that  result  is 
processed by a majority voting system to produce a single output. If any one of the three 
systems fails, the other two systems can correct and mask the fault. In this dissertation, I  
will apply the basic idea of TMR into the stability improvement of PG-PUFs. The process 
is as follows: I investigate this technique by using fixed-length bitstrings, e.g., 256 bits. A 
TMR-based bitstring is created during enrollment by copying the first 256 strong bits into 
the first copy of the fixed-length bitstring. The second two copies are created by parsing 
the remaining strong bits and searching for matches to the first copy. The positions of the 
matching bits  are  indicated  by writing a '1'  in  the  public  storage  bitstring,  while  the 
positions of the skipped bits are indicated by writing a '0'. Later during regeneration, the 
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public storage bitstring is consulted to determine which challenges are to be used to re-
construct the 3 copies of the bitstring. Once created, the final bitstring is obtained by 
majority voting on each bit.
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Chapter 3 
Two Primitives of a PUF Based on 
Resistance Variations in Metals
This  chapter  will  follow  the  structure  of  our  paper  [65],  and  mainly  focus  on  the 
following several aspects. Firstly, two implementations of PUFs for both 65 nm and 90 
nm technologies are described in Section  3.1. Secondly, the experimental techniques and 
procedure are given in Section   3.2. Finally,  the  experimental results are analyzed by 
statistical tests in Section  3.3.    
 3.1 Experimental Setup
 3.1.1  Test Chip Architecture: 90 nm chips
Fig. 3.1 gives a block diagram of the 90 nm test chip architecture. The chip padframe 
consists of 56 I/Os, and surrounds a chip area of approx. 1.5 mm x 1.5 mm. Four PADs 
labeled PS1, PS2, NS1, NS2 along the top of the figure refer to voltage sense connections, 
the 'P' version for sensing voltages near VDD and the 'N' version for voltages near GND. 
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These four terminals wire onto the chip and connect to 85 copies of a Stimulus/Measure 
circuit (SMC). The SMCs are distributed across the entire chip (see small rectangles) as 
two arrays, a 7x7 outer array and a 6x6 inner array. Although not shown, a scan chain 
connects serially to each of the SMCs to allow each of them to be controlled.
       
The schematic diagram of the SMC is shown in Fig. 3.2. A pair of large ‘shorting 
transistor’, capable of sinking approx. 10 mA of current through the power grid when 
enabled,  are  shown along  the  bottom of  the  figure.  A set  of  16  ‘pseudo’ pass  gates 
(hereafter referred to as transmissions gates or TGs) serve as voltage sense devices. Eight 
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Fig. 3.1: Block diagram of 90 nm chips, with voltage sense pins along top  
and two arrays of SMCs, a 7x7 outer array and a 6x6 inner  
array.
of the TGs connect to 8 (of the 9) metal layers that define the VDD stack-up of the power 
grid, as shown on the left side of Fig. 3.2, while the other 8 connect to the GND stack-up. 
Scan FFs and 3-to-8 decoders allow exactly one of the pass gates to be enabled in each of  
the stack-ups.
              
                               
An additional TG connects to the drains of the 8 stack-up TGs, labeled as '2'  in Fig. 
3.2, one for VDD and one for GND. Separate scan FFs control the connection to the chip-
wide  wires  that  route  to  the  P/NSX pins  of  Fig.  3.1.  The  configuration  and  control 
mechanism allows any VDD and GND voltages to be measured using off-chip voltmeters. 
We refer to these experiments using PG90, for power grid 90 nm chips.           
A 'challenge'  in  our experiments is  applied by configuring the scan chain to 1) 
enable the shorting transistors within an SMC, and 2) enable two TGs in the same SMC, 
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Fig. 3.2: SMC schematic in 90 nm chips.
in particular, the TG labeled 2 in Fig.  3.2 and one from the group 1a through 1h. Once 
enabled, the voltage drop/rise is measured on the NS and PS pads using voltmeters.
Although the details of the power grid are not shown, approx. 20% of the routing 
resources are used to define it, as would be typical of a high-performance commercial 
power grid. Moreover, the metal wires defining the power grid are at least 3 times wider 
than the minimum width, and via arrays  (as supposed to single via) are used to connect  
one metal layer to the next. The low resistance associated with these wires and via arrays 
produces voltage drops in some experiments of 500  μV or less. Although our off-chip 
instrumentation can measure voltage drops at high resolution (approx. 5 μV), these levels 
will  challenge the capabilities of on-chip ‘instruments’.  We discuss solutions to these 
issues and others as lessons learned in the following sections.
 3.1.2  Test Chip Architecture: 65 nm chips 
The 65 nm test chip architecture is shown as a block diagram in Fig.  3.3(a). A 50x80 
array of SMCs are distributed, in close proximity, over a region that spans 560  m by 380 
 m. The power grid is wired in a mesh configuration over 10 metal layers using wide 
metal  wires  and via  arrays.  The  details  of  the  SMC are  shown in  Fig.  3.3(b).  Each 
consists of a shorting inverter, a sense transistor and two scan FFs. The shorting inverter 
draws approx. 1 mA and introduces a 5-10 mV drop on the VDD grid. The single sense 
transistor allows only M1 voltages to be sensed. We refer to these experiments as PG65. 
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 3.1.3   Challenge Scenarios
There are several 'challenge' scenarios possible in the PG90 and PG65 experiments. The 
basic approach we take in our experiments is to enable the shorting devices within each 
SMC,  as  well  as  the  corresponding pass  gates,  one  at  a  time,  and then measure  the 
voltage drop/rise produced at each location. A bit in the digital response of our PG-PUF is 
obtained by comparing two voltages obtained from a pairing of SMCs on a single bit.
In order to increase the size of the bitstring generated from the PG-PUFs, each of 
these voltages can be compared with other voltages in various combination to produce a 
bit string. We focus our analysis on bit string generated by using each voltage in (n-1) 
comparisons, where n is the total number of voltages measured  from one chip. Bit strings  
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        Fig. 3.3: a) Block diagram of 65 nm chip and (b) details of the  
SMC.
(a) (b)
constructed in this manner are referred to as all combinations or AC.
As is customary, we randomize the order in which the comparisons are made. On 
chip, this can be accomplished using an LFSR and a seed. The process is modeled in our 
experiments  using  the  functions  srand  (seed)  and  rand  (  )  from the  C  programming 
library. In order to show that the characteristics of the bit strings are insensitive to the 
value of the seed, we report statistical results using 10 different seeds.
In addition to randomizing the order of the pairings, we found that periodically 
inverting  the  comparison  order  within  pairings  produced  better  results.  In  particular, 
inverting every group of three comparisons worked well for both the PG90 and PG65 
experiments. For example, for a randomized set of pairing numbered 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,  
8, 9, 10, 11, etc., pairings numbered 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, etc. are inverted. Note that the 
inversion operation occurs after the randomization, which makes this process trivial to 
implement on chip.
 3.2 Experiment Techniques
 3.2.1  Bias Issues
The  voltage  measured  from  the  chips  in  our  experiments  consists  of  three  basic 
components: bias, regional variation and noise component. From the PUF perspective, 
only  the  regional  variation  component  is  important,  and  the  other  two  components 
actually work to reduce randomness and stability, resp. Bias is a systematic voltage trend 
that is introduced by, e.g., a non-uniform distribution of power port connections to the 
power grid (the case for the PG90 chips) or non-uniform power grid mesh (the case for 
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the PG65 chips). Any type of systematic voltage trend will produce bits that are biased to 
0 or 1 across chips, and needs to be reduced or eliminated in practice. We first discuss the 
biases that exist on our data sets and then methods of dealing with them. 
        
Fig.3.4 show the voltage drop profile obtained from PG experiments on one of the 
90 nm chips as each SMC is enabled. The voltage drop profile is derived from the M1 
sense transistors on the VDD grid. The (x,y)-plane in the figure represents the position in 
the array of the SMC in the 2-D array. From the bowl-like surface, it is clear that the 
voltage  drops  are  larger  along  the  edges  of  the  power  grid  than  in  the  center.  This 
systematic  voltage  trend is  caused by the non-uniform distribution of the power port 
connections,  which  from Fig.  3.1 are  located  over  the  'Design Macros'  in  the  center 
region of the chip,  i.e., there are no power ports along the edges.         
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        Fig. 3.4: VDD profile using SMCs of a 90 nm chip. 
             
Although much less apparent, a small bias also exists in the voltage drop profile 
shown in Fig.  3.5,  which is  derived from one of the 65 nm chips.  Here,  the voltage 
differences computed for the SMCs are plotted for each of the 4,000 elements of the array 
shown in Fig. 3.3. The majority of the voltage variations (approx. +/- 1 mV from Fig. 3.5) 
is  introduced  by  regional  resistance  variations  in  the  metal  defining  the  power  grid. 
However, a small 'saw-tooth-shaped' bias exists between adjacent rows of approx. 200 
μV, which is introduced by a pattern in power grid metal mesh that is different for the 
even and odd rows of the array. This subtle pattern is revealed by computing an average 
voltage using the voltages measured across each row, for each of the 80 rows in the array. 
Averaging  reduces  the  random variations  allowing  the  bias  effect  to  be  more  easily 
observed. 
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Fig. 3.5: Voltage drops from 4,000 SMCs on a PG65 chip. 
Fig. 3.6 plots the average values on the y-axis for each row identified along the x-
axis. It is clear that the average voltages are smaller for even-numbered rows, than for 
odd-numbered rows. Moreover, the points labeled 'edge effects' reveal a second source of 
bias that is introduced by the power grid architecture. In this case, the increase in the 
voltage drops/rises is caused by the close proximity of these SMCs to the edge of the 
power grid.
                   
 3.2.2  Dealing with Bias
There are several ways of eliminating the bias from the voltage measurements in these 
chips. The multi-layered architecture of the SMCs used in the PG90 chips allow voltage 
drops/rises to be computed across each of the metal layers. In order to reduce bias effects  
and correlations that exist in the VDD and GND stack-ups, we compute  inter-layer voltage 
drops/rises, which can be computed by subtracting pair-wise, the voltages measured from 
the  consecutive  metal  layers,  i.e.,  VM1-VM2,  VM2-VM3,  etc.  These  Voltage  differences, 
called  power  grid  voltage  difference  (PGVD),  also  allow  the  PUF  to  leverage  the 
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Fig. 3.6: Average voltage drops across 80 rows of PG65.
independent resistance variations that occur in each of the metal layers of the power grid, 
and  given  their  differential  nature,  significantly  reduces  bias  effects  such  as  those 
discussed in reference to Fig.  3.4. The bit string is then produced by comparing these 
voltage differences,  e.g.,  if  VM1-VM2 in  the VDD stack-up at  SMC1 is  greater  than  the 
voltage VM1-VM2 in the VDD stack up at SMC2, then a '1' is generated, otherwise a '0'.
In the PG65 chips, each SMC has only one 'voltage sense' transistor connected to 
the VDD grid, and therefore, computing inter-layer voltage drops is not possible. In this 
case, we avoid the bias by restricting voltage comparisons between SMCs positioned on 
every other row ( to deal with the “saw-tooth” effect)  and eliminate those positioned 
along the edges of the array (to deal with “edge effects”). In particular, we eliminate the 
SMCs along the left and right columns, the bottom row and the top two row. This reduces 
the size of the array to 77x48, and restricts comparisons between SMCs on the remaining 
39 odd numbered rows and the 38 even numbered rows. We refer to this scheme as bias 
avoidance. 
We also propose a more general technique to eliminate bias which is applicable to 
any type of PUF measurement, including, for example, RO frequencies and delays. For 
PUFs based on voltage measurements, the method first divides the voltage drops by a 
value that upper bounds the noise level. The general idea here is to eliminate the smaller 
noise variations, effectively reducing the range of values observed in a set of repeated 
samples for a given challenge to 1 or 2 distinct values. Once the voltage drops are re-
digitized, the remainder from applying a modulus is used in the comparison operation to 
produce  the  bit.  The  modulus  is  chosen  to  preserve  the  regional  (high  frequency) 
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variation while simultaneously 'trimming off' the bias effects present in the high order 
bits. This approach is also applicable for PUFs that compare digital values, e.g., counter  
values  in  RO-based  PUFs.  In  this  case,  the  modulus  operation  eliminate  systematic, 
across chip shift in frequency.
 3.2.3  Bit Stability
In our experiments, we found that unstable bits, defined as bits that are susceptible to 
'flipping' because their voltages are very similar, actually reduce several quality metrics 
associated with the overall bit string, including inter-chip HD and NIST statistical test 
results.  Moreover,  including unstable  in  the  bit  string  requires  the  inclusion  of  error 
correction and Helper data schemes, that weaken security and increase overhead.
An alternative scheme that is able to identify and discard unstable bits works as 
follows. First, process is applied to determine the approx. noise level, either by using 
measurements  carried  out  after  manufacture  or  by  using  an on-chip noise  evaluation 
process. In either case, noise levels can be determined empirically by applying a set of 
challenges repeatedly and examining the stability of the bit strings produced. In cases 
where  bit  flips  occur,  the  magnitude  of  the  difference  between  the  voltages  being 
compared is used to determine a threshold, that defines an upper bound on the voltage 
difference required to ensure bit stability. A safety margin is added to the threshold to 
account for environmental variations that can occur later in the field.
The  usage  scenarios  that  enables  this  process  to  be  applied  where  exact 
regeneration of a bit string  is required works as follows. During the initial bit string 
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generation, the threshold method is used to identify the unstable bits. For each unstable 
bit, its numbered position in the sequence challenges applied to generate the bit string 
(for  a  given  seed)  is  recorded  in  non-volatile  memory.  Later,  during  regeneration, 
thresholding is disabled and the non-volatile memory is consulted to determine which 
challenges to skip during bit generation. To further enhance protection against one-time 
events,  such  as  voltage  spikes  or  scan  configuration  errors,  repeated  sampling  and 
majority voting can be used again in the regeneration process to arrive at a final bit string.  
We investigate this process in the experimental results section below.
 3.2.4  Statistical Characterization of the Bit Strings
Several  statistical  techniques  are  applied  to  evaluate  the  ‘quality’ of  the  bit  strings 
produced by the PG PUFs. Hamming Distance (HD) is defined as the number of bits that 
are different when two bit strings are compares. An average inter-chip HD is compared 
using all combinations of bit string from the chip population. The best result occurs when 
exactly half of the bits from any two bit strings are different, i.e, when the HD, expressed 
as a percentage, is 50%. An intra-chip HD is computed using all combinations of bit 
strings obtained from one chip in the population, i.e., using the bit strings produced when 
the  challenges  are  repeatedly  applied.  An  average  intra-chip  HD  is  computed  by 
averaging all of the individual intra-chip HDs. The ideal value in this case is 0%, i.e., 
each chip is able to reproduce the same bit string given the same set of challenges.
The statistical tests developed at NIST are also applied at significance level of 0.01 
(the default) [1]. In general, the NIST tests look for 'patterns' in the bit strings that are not 
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likely to be found at all or above a give frequency in a ‘truly random’ bit string. For 
example, long or short strings of 0’s and 1’s, or specific patterns repeated in many places 
in the bit string work against randomness. The output of the NIST statistical evaluation 
engine is the number of chips that pass the null  hypothesis for a given test. The null 
hypothesis  is  specified  as  the  condition  in  which  the  bit-string-under-test  is  random. 
Therefore,  a  good  result  is  obtained  when  the  number  of  chips  that  pass  the  null 
hypothesis is large. 
 3.3 Experimental Results
 3.3.1  PG90 Experiments
We collected data from 60 copies of the 90 nm chips and generated bit strings using the 
AC (all  combinations)  scenarios  described  in  Section   3.1.3  .  Although  the  SMC is 
designed to sense voltages in any of the first 8 metal layers, the voltage drops above M4 
are smaller than those on the lower metal layers. This occurs because the metal wires in 
the upper metal layers are much wider (and thicker) than wires in the lower portion of the 
grids. Given the concern we expressed in Section 3.1.1 regarding the capabilities of on-
chip instrumentation, we restrict our analysis to voltages measured in the lower 4 metal 
layers.
The focus of the PG90 experiments is on inter-layer resistance variations. Inter-
metal  layer  resistance  variations  can  be  captured  by  computing  voltage  differences 
between consecutive metal layers. Since there are 8 TGs in the VDD and GND stacks as 
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shown in Fig. 3.2, which indicating that 7 PGVD can be computed per stack. Given these 
constraints, each chip generates 85 SMCs*3 metal layer pairings=255 PGVDs for each of 
the VDD and GND stacks. The bit string is then produced by comparing these voltage 
differences, e.g., if VM1-VM2 in the VDD stack-up at SMC1 is greater than the voltage VM1- 
VM2 in the VDD stack-up at SMC2, then a '1' is generated, otherwise a '0'. We focus our 
analysis on bitstrings generated by comparing each PGVD with all others generated using 
the same metal layer pairing.Therefore, the total number of bits per chip is 85*84/2 per 
metal  layer  pairing  *3  metal  layer  pairing*2  grids=3,570*6=21,420  bits.These 
experiments are referred to as PGVD or DIFF. For comparison purposes, we also carry 
out a similar analysis using the absolute voltages (referred to as ABS). In this case, the 
number of bits increases to 28,560 bits because there are 4 metal layers. 
As  indicated  in  Section 3.2.3  ,  our  methodology  eliminates  unstable  bits  by 
comparing the voltage difference of the pairing with a threshold. To increase confidence, 
repeated sampling is also employed during bit stability evaluation. Therefore, for a bit to 
be considered stable, the voltage difference must exceed the threshold in all samples. For 
the  DIFF  experiments,  a  25  μV threshold  was  sufficient  to  ensure  that  no  bit  flips 
occurred for voltage pairings where the absolute value of the analog difference across all 
samples (5 in this case) was larger than this value. The threshold increased to 50 μV for 
the  ABS  analysis.  Bear  in  mind  that  the  threshold  actually  guards  against  voltage 
variations as large as the threshold in each voltage of the pairing. For example, a voltage 
pairing defined as (6.000 mV, 6.025 mV) in the first sample would need to vary to values 
larger than (6.050 mV, 6.000 mV) in all subsequent samples to violate a 50 μV threshold 
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model. 
The distribution of the HDs for the  ABS and DIFF analyses are shown in Fig. 
3.9(a) and (b), resp. HD is plotted along the x-axis against the number of instances on the 
y-axis. 
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Fig. 3.7: Distribution of HDs using (a) stable DIFF (M1-M4) 
(b) stable ABS (M1-M4) bit strings from PG90 exps. 
(a)
(b)
The total number of the instances is given by all combinations of the chips’ bit 
strings,  i.e.,  60*59/2=1,770.  After  removing  unstable  bits  using  to  the  algorithm 
described above, the bit string sizes reduce by approx. 46% on average to 11,600 bits for 
DIFF and by approx. 12% to 25,121 bits for ABS. The results are also shown in Table. 
3.1. Bear in mind that these percentages do NOT represent the number of bit flips. The 
actual average intra-chip HDs are 2.63% and 0.61%, respectively. The size of bit strings 
used  in  the  HD analysis  are  slightly  smaller  at  9,592  and  24,446  respectively.  This 
adjustment is necessary because the HD analysis must be carried out on bit strings of 
equal length. To accomplish this, the chip with the shortest stable bit string is used to 
define the length of all bit strings. 
# of chips Total raw 
bitstring
Threshold 
value
Average 
survived rate 
with 
thresholding
Average stable 
bitstring with 
thresholding 
scheme 
DIFF 60 21420 25 μV 54.00% 11600
ABS 60 28560 50 μV 88.00% 25121
Although the number of bits discarded as unstable using the threshold method is 
relatively  large,  the  benefits  of  constructing  a  stable  bit  string  in  this  fashion  are 
significant. First, the average inter-chip HD for DIFF improves from 38.2% (not shown 
but  with  unstable  bits  included)  to  49.97%  as  shown  in  the  figure.  For  ABS,  the 
improvement is even more dramatic, from 8.4% to 49.79%. The results can be seen more 
clearly in Table. 3.2. The superimposed Gaussian curve on the DIFF distribution of Fig. 
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Table 3.1: Results for DIFF and ABS analyses with the 
thresholding scheme for PG90 exps.
3.7(a) illustrates the distribution to close to ideal, and reflects the power of differential 
analysis. The ABS distribution, on the other hand, is skewed somewhat to the left, which 
indicates that a component of the bias discussed earlier in reference to Fig.  3.4 is still 
present. 
# of chips Average inter-
chip HD 
without 
thresholding
Average inter-
chip HD with 
thresholding
Ideal inter-chip
HD
DIFF 60 38.20% 49.97% 50.00%
ABS 60 8.40% 49.79% 50.00%
 Fig. 3.8 shows a bargraph of the number of passing chips (z-axis) for a subset of 
the NIST tests (x-axis) using 10 different seeds (y-axis). Only those tests applicable to bit 
strings of length 9,952 are applied. As indicated earlier, the best result is a ‘pass’ for all 
60 chips. Although difficult to see, an ideal score of 60 was achieved in 40 (of the 90) 
cases. The worst result occurs for the NonOverlapping Template test. The height of the 
bars for this test represent the average number of passing chips across 148 templates. 
Although the chips performed very well on this test overall, there are 37 cases (of a total  
of  1,480)  where the  minimum number of  passing  chips was not  met  (57 is  required 
according to NIST). The smallest number of passing chips among these fails is 54, with 
the majority (20) failing by only 1 chip. In a second set of seed trials (not shown) a 
couple of other tests failed,  e.g.,  Cumm. Sums test,  but never by more than 2 chips. 
Moreover, all of Pvalue-of-the-Pvalues tests passed, indicating the P-values are uniformly 
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Table 3.2: Improvement of inter-chip HDs for DIFF and ABS 
analyses with the thresholding scheme for PG90 exps.
distributed between 0.0 and 1.0. 
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Fig. 3.8: NIST test suite statistics using DIFF (M1- M4) 
                stable bit strings in PG90 exps. 
Fig. 3.9: NIST test suite statistics using ABS (M1-M4) 
                stable-bit strings in PG90 exps. 
In contrast, the results for ABS data shown in Fig. 3.9 reveal that the bit strings fail 
the Runs and Approx. Entropy tests by as many as 50 chips in some instances. Overall,  
these results indicate the bit strings generated from the DIFF (M1-M4) version of the PG 
PUF are of cryptographic quality.   
 3.3.2  PG65 Experiments 
As described in Section  3.2.2 , the bias avoidance scheme pairs voltages from 39 odd-
numbered rows + 38 even-numbered rows in all combinations to produce bit strings of 
length 3,413,832 in the PG65 experiments. We repeatedly applied the challenges 10 times 
to each of the 58 chips at 25oC, and used a voltage threshold of 250 μV to eliminate all 
bits in the repeated samples. As indicated earlier, only VDD voltages in M1 can be sensed 
in the 65 nm chips, so the analysis is classified as ABS. 
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(a)
The distribution of the inter-chip HDs is shown in Fig.  3.10(a).  The length of the 
stable bit strings are 2,052,003 bits on average, which represents approx. a 40% decrease 
in the original length. The results are summarized in Table 3.3.
# of chips Total raw 
bitstring
Threshold 
value
Average survived 
rate with 
thresholding
Average stable 
bitstring with 
thresholding 
scheme 
ABS 58 3413832 250 μV 60.00% 2052003
The intra-chip HD is approx. 1.2%, which indicates that a significant number of 
bits that are discarded as unstable do not flip in any of the 10 samples. The benefits of 
54
(b)
Fig. 3.10: Distribution of HDs using (a) stable ABS (b) unstable 
                   ABS bit strings from PG65 exps. 
Table 3.3: Results with the thresholding scheme for PG65 exps.
discarding these bits are, once again, the improvements obtained in bit string quality and 
the elimination of on-chip error correction hardware. 
In order to illustrate the improvement in quality, Fig. 3.10(b) shows the distribution 
of the inter-chip HDs using the full length 3,413,832-bit strings. The average inter-chip 
HD drops from 50.0002% to 49.0851% when the unstable bits are included. Moreover, 
the standard deviation of the distribution is significantly larger, e.g., 624 vs. 26,353. 
The bargraphs  in Figs.  3.11 and  3.12 give the NIST statistical test results for the 
stable and unstable bit  strings, resp. The results from all 15 NIST tests are displayed 
along the x-axis, for 10 different seeds plotted along the y-axis. The ideal value is 58 for 
all tests except NIST tests 12 and 132. A numerical analysis of the data indicates that 58 
of the bars reach the ideal value in Fig. 3.11 while only 35 achieve this status in Fig. 3.12.
The  stable  bit  strings  pass  all  tests  except  for  7  (of  a  total  of  1,480) 
NonOverLapping Template tests. 6 of the 7 fails are by only 1 chip (54 chips passed 
instead of the required 55) and 1 failed by 2 chips. In addition, 3 PValue- of-the-Pvalue 
tests failed in this group of 1,480 tests. Moreover, three of the seeds passed every test. 
Overall, these results indicate that the stable bit strings are high quality and can be used 
in cryptographic applications. 
The larger number of fails in the unstable bit string results of Fig. 3.12 indicate that 
these  bit  strings  are  lower  in  quality.  For  example,  only  1  seed  passed  the  NIST 
Frequency test, which measures the balance of ‘0’s and ‘1’s in the bit strings. Overall, 50 
of the 150 (10 seeds * 15 NIST tests) fail. However, the fewest number of passing chips 
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is  41,  which  is  better  than the  worst  case result  obtained in  the  PG90 ABS M1-M4 
analysis described in Section  3.3.1 . 
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Fig. 3.12: NIST test suite statistics using unstable
                 bit strings for PG65 exps. 
Fig. 3.11: NIST test suite statistics using stable bit strings
                 for PG65 exps.
 3.3.3  Modulus Technique for Bias in PG65 Experiments
We investigate a second strategy for dealing with bias using a subset of the data from the 
PG65 experiments where bias is particularly evident. In these experiments, we do not use 
the bias avoidance scheme. The inter-chip distribution of HDs shown in Fig.  3.13(a) is 
derived from the 4,000 SMCs paired with their ‘vertical’ neighbor. Bias is reflected here 
in a lower-than-ideal average HD of 46.5% and in the bi-modal shape characteristic of the 
distribution.             
The distribution labeled ‘Modulus Op.” shown in Fig. 3.13(b) is derived using the 
same pairings. The voltages in this case are first manipulated (as discussed in Section 
 3.2.2 ) by dividing by a noise threshold of 350 μV and then using the remainder from a 
modulus operation (11 is used in this analysis) in the bit generation process. The removal 
of the bias improves the average HD to 50.1% and re-shapes the distribution to conform 
better to a Gaussian. Although this technique is effective, it is no substitute for a well-
designed architecture that minimizes bias. Fig.  3.13(c) shows the distribution obtained 
when the bias avoidance scheme is used to illustrate this concept. 
Note that the length of the bit  strings is  smaller  (3,600) because of the pairing 
constraints. Although the average HD is slightly less than ideal at 49.7%, the shape and 
standard deviation of the distribution are both superior to those of Fig. 3.13(b).  
         
57
        
58
Fig.  3.13: HD analysis  of bit  strings using unmodified  
voltages (a) with modulus op. (b) and using  
bias avoidance (c) for PG65 exps.
(c)
(b)(a)
(c)
 3.4 Conclusion
Two PUF implementations, which leverages resistance variations of the power grid, are 
discussed and analyzed. Experimental results are reported for chips fabricated in 90 nm 
and 65 nm technologies.  A voltage threshold technique is  investigated that eliminates 
unstable bits and is shown to significantly improve inter-chip HD and the results from 
NIST  statistical  tests.  Both  of  these  two  PUF  primitives  are  shown  to  generate 
cryptographic quality bis strings of length upto 1.6M bits.
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Chapter 4
  
Stability Analysis of PG-PUFs with 
Environmental Variations
In  Chapter  3,  all  the  experiments  for  the  PG-PUFs  were  carried  out  under  room 
temperature (25oC).  Actually,  PUFs are sensitive to  environmental  variations and will 
detract  from their  ability  to generate  the same signature (reproducibility  or  stability). 
Since  PG-PUFs  leverage  the  passive  component  of  metal  resistance  to  generate  bit 
strings,  theoretically,  they  should  be  less  sensitive  than  other  types  of  PUFs,  i.e., 
transistor-based PUFs. In this section, we will carry out a series of experiments against 
different temperatures and voltages to evaluate the stability of  PG-PUFs. Therefore, the 
main contribution of this chapter is focusing on determining the temperature and voltage 
(TV) stability of PG-PUFs. A significant benefit of using metal structure is that “noise-
related” variations, such as those introduced by TV variations, result in linear changes to 
the measured voltages. This linear scaling characteristic allows the relative magnitude of 
two voltages to remain constant across changes in temperature and voltage, which,  in 
turn, improves the stability of the PUF to bit-flips, when compared, for example to PUFs 
which leverage transistor-based PUFs.
60
In  our  experiments,  we  evaluate  the  PG-PUFs  at  9  TV corners,  i.e.,  over  all 
combinations of 3 temperatures; -40OC, 25OC and 85OC, and 3 voltages; normal and +/- 
10% of nominal. The evaluation is carried out on a set of chips fabricated in IBM's 90 
nm, 9 metal layer bulk silicon process. The stability of the bitstrings is measured using 
intra-chip HD and “probability of failure' techniques. Randomness and uniqueness are 
also evaluated  using the NIST test suite and inter-chip HD methods. A bit-flip avoidance 
scheme is proposed and evaluated that reduces the probability of a failure to reproduce 
the bitstring to less that 1E-9. We also investigate an on-chip voltage-to-digital converter 
(VDC) and its stability across the 9 TV corners. This chapter is following the structure of 
our paper [67].
 4.1 PGV Experiments and Challenge Scenarios 
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Fig. 4.1: SMC schematic in 90 nm chips. 
The experimental setup in this chapter is still the same as described in  3.1.1 . Here, 
I  will  give  the  SMC schematic  of  90  nm chip  again  as  shown in  Fig.  4.1.  For  the 
challenge scenarios, we still use the method of PGVD (or DIFF) presented in section
3.1.1  and 3.3.1  . As described in chapter   3.1.3  , each of the PGVDs can be compared 
with other PGVDs in various combinations to produce a bitstring and can get 21,420 bits. 
In the TV experiments, we also randomize the order in which the comparisons are made. 
In an on-chip implementation, this can be accomplished using an LFSR and a seed. 
 4.2  Overhead
On the 90 nm chip, each SMC occupies an area of 684 μm2(38 μm x 18 μm), so the total 
area occupies by the array of 85 SMCs is 684x85=58,140  μm2. The VDC occupies an 
area of 145 μm x 63 μm. The size of on-chip memory to store the helper data is approx. 
2,680 bytes. Generally, the equation 4.1 can decide how many bits for the helper data are 
needed in order to remove the unstable bits with thresholding scheme.
 # of bits of the helper data=# of bits (required bitstring size)*
                  (1/survived rate of the raw bitstring with thresholding scheme)            (4.1)
For  the  helper  data  needed  for  both  thresholding  and  TMR schemes,  the  size 
becomes 5 times of that for thresholding only, since the TMR-based bitstring of length n 
requires approx. 5*n strong bits to construct. For example, with the thresholding scheme, 
the survived rate of the raw bitstring is 35%; if a fixed-length bitstring of 256 bits is  
desired,  the helper  data should be 256*(1/0.35)= 731 bits.  For both thresholding and 
TMR schemes, 731*5=3,655 bits are needed to determine the desired bitstring.
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 4.3 Experimental Results 
 4.3.1  Bit Stability
In our TV experiments, there also exists the problem of bit flipping or unstable bits. We 
still use the thresholding scheme to identify and discard unstable bits as described earlier 
in  3.2.3 . As we know, thresholding is carried out by first computing a threshold from the 
distribution characteristics of the PGVDs. The only difference is that in Chapter 3, the 
threshold is used with a fixed value for both 90 nm and 64 nm technology, while the 
threshold here is decided by using the percentage range of PGVD distribution.  This is 
illustrated using the GND and VDD PGVD distributions for a sample chip, CHIP1, in Fig. 
4.2. Each distribution contains 255 PGVD values, derived as described in Section  3.3.1 . 
The distance between the 10% and 90% points in the distribution is used to derive the 
thresholds for the thresholding algorithm, which is approx. 0.3 mV for GND PGVDs and 
0.15 mV for the VDD PGVDs for this chip. The limits at 10% and 90% are used to avoid 
distortions caused by potential outliers in the PGVD values for each chip. This method is 
more effective since the width of PGVD distribution of each chip is different. Using the 
percentage range to derive threshold can make sure every chip can produce the close 
number of strong bits.
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Fig.  4.2:  CHIP1  GND  and  VDD PGVD  distribution  with  
Gaussian curve fits and 10% and 90% thresholds.
       (a)
       (b)
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Fig. 4.3: CHIP1  GND PGVD differences computed for bit generation  
during enrollment (a) and regeneration  (b) at 9 TVs. Points  
in  upper  portion  of  plots  generate  '1's,  points  in  lower  
portion generate '0's.
     The thresholds are then scaled by a constant to produce the actual threshold used 
during bit generation. Fig. 4.3 provides an illustration of the bit generation process using 
the GND PGVDs for CHIP1. Both graphs plot the bit comparison number along the x-
axis against the value of the difference between the two PGVDs being compared. Only 
the bits that survive the thresholding, called strong bits, are included in the plots, i.e., the 
x-axis shows only about half of the 10,710 comparisons. Points that appear in the upper 
portion of the figure generate a '1' bit while points in the lower portion generate a '0' bit.
        Fig.4.3(a) shows only the points obtained from enrollment, which is carried out at 
25oC, 1.2V. The thresholds are depicted using two horizontal  lines at 0.11 and -0.11 mV 
obtained from the distribution by a constant 0.37. In contract, Fig. 4.3(b) adds in the data 
points from the remaining 8 TV (regeneration) corners,  colored-coded to indicate the 
temperature; green for 25 OC, blue for -40OC and red for 85OC. Close inspection reveals 
that some of the data points from regeneration appear within the threshold band of width 
0.22 mV, centered around 0.0. Noise that occurs during regeneration causes points to 
move vertically, but as long as none move across the 0.0 line, no bit-flips occur.
          The usage scenario that enables this process to be applied in situations where exact  
regeneration  of  a  bitstring  is  required  works  as  follows.  During  the  initial  bitstring 
generation, thresholding is used to identify the unstable bits. For each unstable bit, its 
numbered  position  in  the  sequence  of  challenges  applied  to  generate  the  bitstring  is 
recorded in public storage. Later during regeneration, during regeneration, thresholding is 
disabled and the public memory is  consulted to determine which challenges to apply 
during bit generation.
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 4.3.2  Statistical Characterization of the Bitstrings
The results of applying the thresholding techniques to 63 chips tested under 9 TV corners 
are described in this section. An important concern regarding the thresholding technique 
deals with the fraction of bits that survive it. In our experiments, we found this fraction to 
be different for the GND and VDD stacks. On average, approx. 50% of the comparisons 
using the GND PGVDs survive the thresholding, while only 20% of the comparisons 
survive  using the VDD PGVDs.  The lower value  for  the VDD PGVDs analysis  occurs 
because of the increased noise levels on the VDD grid relative to the GND grid.  As a 
consequence, the average bitstring length reduces to approximate 7,765 (36.25%) bits 
from the original size of 21,420 bits. These bitstrings are, however, reproducible at all of 
the 9 TV corners.
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Fig. 4.4: Distribution of HDs using stable bitstrings from 63  
chips. Number of HD is 1,953 using bitstrings of  
length 7,343 bits.
        The true average intra-chip HD, which is a measure of the underlying bit stability 
across the TV corners, is computed as 4.01%. This value is obtained by analyzing the full 
length, i.e., 21,420-bit, bitstrings with thresholding disabled and counting the number of 
times a bit-flip occurs in each bit position across all pairings (9*8/2=36) of the bitstrings 
produced under  each of the 9 TV corners  for  each chip.  The average intra-chip HD, 
expressed as a percentage, is obtained by dividing the number of bit flips by 36*21,420, 
which is the total number of bit pairings inspected for each chip, and multiplying by 100. 
The value reported is the average of these percentages across all chips. Any value less 
than approx. 5% is  onsidered high quality according to the published literature on PUFs.
          Inter-chip HD, as indicated earlier, measures the uniqueness of the bitstrings, where 
the best possible result is 5%, i.e., on average, half of the bits in the bitstrings of any two 
arbitrary chips are different. Fig. 4.4 plots the distribution of inter-chip HDs. The 1,953 
HDs included in the distribution are obtained by pairing the stable bitstrings from all 
chips under all combinations. The chip with the shortest stable bitstring is used to set the 
size of the bitstrings used in each HD calculation, requiring all bitstrings to be truncated 
to 7,343 bits. The average HD is 3,666.8 (49.94%), which is very close to the ideal HD of 
3,671.5 (50.00%).
      We also evaluate randomness using the NIST statistical tests at the default signifi-
cance level of 0.01. Given the relatively short length of the stable bitstrings, only 11 of 
the tests are applicable. The bar graph shown in Fig.  4.5 gives the number of passing 
chips on the z-axis for each of the 11 tests on the x-axis, and for each of 10 different 
seeds  on the y-axis.  The number of passing chips is  in  reference to  passing the null 
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hypothesis. The null hypothesis is specified as the condition in which the bitstring-under-
test is random. Therefore, a good result is obtained when the number of chips that pass 
the null hypothesis is large.
        
With 63 chips, NIST requirs that at least 60 chips produce a p value that is larger 
than  the  significance  level  (α=0.01),  otherwise  the  whole  test  is  considered  'failed'. 
Overall, of the 11*10=110 bars, 41 are full height indicating that all 63 chips passed the 
test, 39 bars have height 61 have 2 have height 60. Therefore, 109 bars of the 110 are 
equal to or larger than the required value to pass the test, and only 1 bars are below the  
threshold at 58. Moreover, all but 8 of Pvalue-of-the-Pvalues tests passed, indicating the 
P-values  are  uniformly  distributed  between  0.0  and  1.0.  The  fails  in  this  category 
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Fig. 4.5: Number of passing chips from NIST tests using 11  
of the 15 applicable tests.
occurred in the Rank and Non-overlapping Template tests, both which NIST recommends 
testing with much larger  bitstrings than those used here.  Overall,  these all  very good 
results and indicate the bitstrings are cryptographic quality.
 4.3.3  Bit-Flip Probability Analysis and Triple-Module-
Redundancy (TMR)
The large size of the bitstrings produced by the PUF can be used to further enhance their 
reliability over that provided by thresholding alone. This can be accomplished creating 3 
copies of a fixed-length bitstrings from the sequence of strong bits produced by the PUF. 
The 3 copies can then compared as a means of detecting and correcting bit flips, in the 
spirit  of a popular scheme used in fault  tolerance called triple-module-redundancy  or 
TMR. TMR is based on a majority voting' scheme in which the final bit for a given bit 
position is obtained by taking the majority across all 3 copies of the bitstrings.
        We investigate this technique using fixed-length bitstrings of 256-bits. A TMR-based 
bitstrings is created during enrollment by coping the first 256 strong bits into the '1st copy' 
of the fixed-length bitstrings as shown in Fig. 4.6. The second two copies are created by 
parsing the remaining strong bits,  searching for matches to the 1st copy. As described 
above for thresholding, the positions of the matching bits are indicated by writing a '1' in 
the public storage bitstring, while the positions of the skipped bits (and the weak bits 
encountered under thresholding) are indicated by writing a '0'. Later, during regeneration, 
the public storage bitstring is consulted to determine which challenges are to be used to 
re-construct the 3 copies of the bitstring. Once created, the final bitstring is obtained by 
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majority vote on each column as shown in Fig. 4.6. This allows the correct bitstring to be 
generated despite any single bit-flips that may occur in a column, such as the one shown 
in the last column of 'Redundant BS1'.
           In order to illustrate the improvement provided by TMR over voltage thresholding 
alone, we iteratively decreased the GND threshold scalar given above as 0.37, in 0.01 
steps  down  to  0.0.  As  the  threshold  is  decreased,  bit  flips  begin  to  occur  in  the 
thresholding-only  bitstrings.  A Thresholding-only  'probability  of  failure'  curve  can be 
constructed by counting the number of bit flips that occur in the bitstrings from all 63 
chips and dividing it by the total number of bits. A similar curve can be constructed using 
TMR, but in this case, a bit flip is not counted unless it occurs in 2 or more of the 3 bits  
of  a  column  as  shown  in  Fig.  4.6.  Moreover,  the  total  number  of  bits  used  in  the 
denominator for the TMR-based curve is reduced by a factor of 3 to account for the 
actual number used in the final TMR-based bitstring.
        Fig. 4.7  plots to the data points for these two curves as well as two 'exponential-
curve' fits to them. The GND threshold scaling constant is plotted along the x-axis against 
the probability of failure on the y-axis. The exponential curve fits allow the probability of 
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Fig. 4.6: TMR process for bitstring regeneration.
failure to be predicted for thresholds beyond (to the right) of the last recorded bit flip in  
our  small  population  of  chips.  For  example,  the  probability  of  failure  using  voltage 
thresholding alone at the 0.37 threshold is 6.5E-7. This improves by over three orders of 
magnitude to 2.4E-10 using the TMR-based scheme. Of course, the TMR-based scheme 
can be expanded to further improve bit-flip resilience by generating 5 (or more copies) of 
the bitstring, at the expense of increased usage of bits and public storage size.   
      
 4.4 VDC experiments
The  analysis  presented  in  the  previous  sections  is  carried  out  on  digitized  voltages 
obtained from an off-chip voltmeter. In this section, we analyze the bitstrings generated 
by the PUF after  digitizing the voltages using an on-chip voltage-to-digital  converter 
(VDC) that is subjected to the same TV corners as the PUF itself. The VDC is similar in 
design to that described in [66] but is used in our application in a unique way.
72
Fig.  4.7:  GND threshold  scaling  constant  vs.  
probability of failure (y-axis).
        The architecture of the VDC is shown in Fig.4.8. The VDC is designed to 'pulse 
shrink' a negative input pulse as it propagates down an inverter chain. As the pulse moves 
down the inverter chain, it activates a corresponding set of latches to record the passing 
of the pulse, where activation is defined as storing a '1'. A thermometer code (TC), i.e., a 
sequence of '1's followed by a sequence of '0's, represented the digitized voltages.
     The  VDC works  by  introducing  a  fixed-width  (constant)  input  pulse,  which  is 
generated by the pulse generator  shown on the left  side of the Fig.  4.8.  Two analog 
voltages, labeled Cal0 and Cal1 connect to a set of series-inserted NFET transistors in the 
inverter chain, with Cal0 connecting to NFETs in even-numbered inverters and Cal1 to 
the  NFETs  in  odd  numbered  inverters  (see  call-out  on  right  side  of  Fig.  4.8).  The 
propagation speed of the two edges associated with the pulse are controlled separately by 
these voltages. The pulse will eventually die out at some point along the invert chain 
when the trailing edge of the pulse 'catches up' the leading edge. This is ensured by fixing 
Cal0 at a voltage higher than Cal1. The digital representation of the applied Cal0/Cal1 
voltages can then be obtained by counting the number of '1's in the latches.
       As described earlier, PGVDs are created by subtracting the voltages measured on 
consecutive metal layers in the power grid. Instead of digitizing these PGVs once-at-a-
time with the VDC and then subtracting them, we carry out the difference operation in 
the analog domain by applying the two voltages from consecutive metal layers to the 
Cal0 and Cal1 inputs.  The larger PGV from the lower metal layer, Mn, of the pair is 
applied to Cal0 while the PGV from the adjacent, higher metal layer, Mn+1, is applied to 
Cal1 (voltage drops are used for the VDD grid voltages, e.g., VDD-VMn).
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            Fig. 4.8 shows how this is accomplished. The PG array is configured to enable the 
PGV on Mn to drive the NS (or PS) pin and an off-chip voltmeter (VM) is then used to 
digitize the value (some process as described for the original experiments). The PGV is 
then multiplied by 15 and added to an offset, and the voltage sum is used to program an 
off-chip power supply which drive Cal0. The exact same process is carried out for the 
PGV produced on metal layer Mn+1 except the value is used to program a second off-chip 
power supply which drive Cal1. The multiplication and offset operations are necessary 
because the VDC requires the Cal0/Cal1 to be set between 500 mV and VDD  for proper 
operation.
           Note that unlike the PGV experiments in  4.3, the on-chip VDC is subjected to the 
same TV variations as the PUF (as would be the case in actual implementation), and 
therefore its characteristics will  vary as well.  We developed a calibration process that 
'tune'  the offset voltage to compensate for some of the changes in VDC behavior but 
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Fig.  4.8:  Voltage-to-Digital  Converter  (VDC).  On  the  left  side  is  off-chip  
instrumentation that measures two voltages from the PG array, adds  
and offset  and programs the Cal0/Cal1 inputs  of the VDC on the  
right.
since the measurements are differential, the VDC is able to self-calibrate and cancel out 
most of the adverse effects of TV variations by itself.
     We carried  out  the  same set  of  experiments  and  followed the  same process  as 
described in Section 3 and 4 on the 63 chips. The results are as follows. The average 
bitstring length after thresholding is 8,388 bits (39.16%) and the shortest one (used to 
truncate the bitstrings from the other chips for the statistical tests) is 7, 506 bits. Both of 
these numbers are slightly larger than the numbers obtained using the PGVs, as described 
in Section  4.3.2 , and indicates that the VDC compensates for some of the TV variations 
that occur in the measured PGVs.
       
         On the other hand, the statistical test results for the VDC-based bitstrings are 
slightly worse than those presented for the PGVs. Fig. 4.9 shows the HD distribution of 
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Fig.  4.9:  Distribution  of  HDs  using  stable  bitstrings  from  63  chips.  
Number of HDs is 1,953 using bitstrings of length 7,506 bits.
the bitstrings and several statistical results, in the same format as Fig. 4.4 for the PGVs. 
Although the inter-chip HD is close to the ideal at 49.87%, the value obtained for the 
PGVs is slightly better (49.94%). Moreover, the standard deviation of 46.3 bits given in 
Fig. 4.9 is slightly larger than that given in Fig. 4.4, primarily due to the long tail on the 
left  side of  Fig.  4.9.  The VDC-based bitstrings were tested using  the same 11 NIST 
statistical tests listed in Fig. 4.5, but using only the first seed. Although most tests were 
passed, the Runs and Approx. Entropy tests failed with 57 and 49 chips passing, resp., 
and 20 of the 148 Non-Overlapping Template tests failed. From table 4.1, the difference 
of experimental results for both PGV and VDC experiments are listed.
# of 
chips
Total raw 
bitstring
Average 
survived rate 
with 
thresholding 
scheme 
Average 
stable 
bitstring 
Shortest 
stable 
bitstring
Average 
inter-chip
HD for 
stable 
bitstrings
PGV 63 21420 36.25% 7765 7343 49.94%
VDC 63 21420 39.16% 8388 7506 49.87%
           In summary, the digitization process carried out by the VDC works well but is not  
as efficient as the off-chip voltmeters at removing the bias that exist in the PGVs. In [67], 
we show a 'bowl-shaped' pattern exists in the M1 voltages across the 2-D array of SMCs 
and  indicated  that  computing  inter-metal  layer  voltage  differences  (as  we  do  there) 
effectively eliminates it. The basic problem with using the VDC to compute the analog 
difference directly deals with the different sensitivities that exist for Cal0 and Cal1. In 
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Table 4.1: Results with the thresholding scheme for both PGV and 
VDC experiments across 9 TV corners for PG90 exps.
particular, Cal1 has higher sensitivities than Cal0, and therefore, the amplification factors 
for voltages applied to Cal0 and Cal1 need to be different (we used 15 for both factors in 
our experiments. The asymmetry in the sensitivities behaves as follows. Assume that the 
Mn  voltage from Fig. 4.8 increases by a fixed constant ΔV and the Mn+1  voltage remains 
constant. Under these conditions, assume the TC for these two measurements is equal to 
x. In contrast, a similar scenario where the voltage Mn remains fixed and the Mn+1 voltage 
increases by the same fixed constant  ΔV does not result in the same ΔTC. Instead, the 
ΔTC is equal to y, where y>x. In other words, a delta change in the upper metal layer 
(Mn+1) voltage has a larger impact on the change in the TC than it does for an equivalent  
lower metal layer (Mn) voltage change. Therefore, the TCs weigh the voltage change in 
the lower metal layer less than a change in the upper metal layer, which distorts their  
relationship to the actual voltage difference.         
 4.5 Temperature-Voltage Stability Analysis
As stated in the earlier part of the thesis, leveraging metal resistance variations as the 
source of entropy for the PUF should be inherently more stable across environmental 
(TV)  variations  than  leveraging  transistor-based  variations  because  metal  resistance 
scales linearly with temperature and voltage. The PGVs used in the analysis presented in 
Section 4.1 actually include variation for both sources. Although the shorting transistors 
from Fig. 3.2 are very large (57x minimum size) and therefore exhibit smaller variations 
in comparison to minimum-sized transistors, they do introduce a component of entropy in 
the PGV analysis. The entropy works to improve the results, but the gain is reduced, as 
we show here, because of the increased sensitivity of transistor-based variations to TV 
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variations (hereafter TV noise).
        In this section, we eliminate transistor variations by dividing the PGV voltages by  
the shorting current, and use the term PGERs, for power grid equivalent resistances, to 
refer to them. In order to get as 'pure' a form as possible of the PGERs, we also subtract 
the  leakage  voltage  and  leakage  current  from the  values  measured  with  the  shorting 
transistors enables. The expression for PGER is given by the following equation 4.2.
                                           PGER=
V short−V leak
I short− I leak
                                                 (4.2)
           The 4 measurements used to define the PGER each add measurement noise, which 
we separate  and distinguish in this analysis from TV noise through sample averaging. We 
create PGER differences (PGERDs) by subtracting pairings of PGERs, as we did for 
PGVs in Section 4.1.
           The objective of our analysis is to show that the PGERDs are more resistant to TV 
variations than are the PGVDs. In order to determine the magnitude of the TV variations 
(or 'noise') we calibrate the PGVD and PGERD data. Calibration removes the DC offsets 
introduced by TV noise in the data but preserves the variations. Calibration is carried out 
by computing the mean PGERD and PGVD over the entire set of SMCs for a given metal 
layer pairing and TV corner.  Correction factors are then computed by subtracting the 
mean value at each of the TV corners from a reference TV corner. The reference is the 
data collected at 25oC, 1.2V. The correction factors are then added to the corresponding 
data from the TV corners.
78
A subset of the calibrated M2-M3 PGERDs and PGVDs computed using data from 
one of our chips as shown in the top and bottom plots of Fig.4.10 resp. The SMC number 
is given along the x-axis and the PGERD/PGVD calibrated to 25oC is plotted along the y-
axis. Each plot shows 9 line-connected curves, one for each TV corner. Each point in the 
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Fig.  4.10:  Subset  of  PGERD (top)  and PGVDs (bottom)  from M2-M3 metal  
layer pairing for GND grid. Data from 9 TV corners is calibrated to  
25OC, 1.2V. All  11 samples from 9 TV corners are also shown for  
each SMC.
curves is the average of 11 samples (the samples are also plotted as unconnected points to 
illustrate measurement noise). The averaging eliminates most of the measurement noise. 
Therefore,variations in the line-connected curves are introduced primarily by TV noise.
The 3s values listed in the PGERD plot indicate that TV noise is approx. 2.7 times 
the measurement noise (1.665/0.620). Bit flips occur when the slopes of the lines between 
any two adjacent pairing of points reverses sign (see plots for examples). In contrast, the 
ratio increases to 7.7 (23/3) for the PGVD analysis. Therefore, TV noise is nearly 3 times 
more likely to introduce a bit flip in the PGVD analysis than in the PGERD analysis.
 4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyze the statistical quality of bitstrings produced by a PUF that 
leverages resistance variations in the power grid wire of an IC. Experimental results are 
reported  for  chips  fabricated  in  a  90  nm  technology,  and  which  are  tested  under  9 
different  temperature-voltage  corners  given  by  the  industrial  standard  specifications. 
Voltage  thresholding  and  TMR-based  techniques  are  investigated  as  a  means  of 
improving the  bit-flip  resilience  of  the  regenerated  bitstrings.  An on-chip  voltage-to-
digital converter is also investigated. The statistical results indicate that the power grid 
PUF is able to generate cryptographic quality bitstrings of significant length.
80
Chapter 5 
Future Work
The experimental results given in Chapter 3 show that the bitstrings derived from metal 
resistance  variations  perform  very  well  on  statistical  tests,  and  can  be  used  in  both 
identification  and  authentication.  In  Chapter  4,  I  apply  different  temperatures  and 
voltages in order to evaluate the stability of the PG-PUFs against environmental noise. 
The experimental results also show that the proposed PG-PUFs are still feasible and can 
be used for real applications. However, in order to make the PG-PUFs more attractive, 
there is still plenty of work to do in the future. In this chapter, I will list several points  
that we will focus on in the following research work. First, a more effective VDC and bit 
generation engine will be developed on the new chip. Since the VDC circuit in Fig. 4.8 
has the problem of susceptibility to differential power attacks (DPA), a new VDC circuit 
is  proposed as  shown in Fig.5.1,  which is  more resistant  to DPA and also avoid  the 
problem of different sensitivity described in section  4.4. Second, to make the PG-PUFs 
get  larger  manufacturing  variations  and  more  entropy,  the  power  grid  of  the  next-
generation chip will be designed using the minimum size of metal wires. Third, since in 
our present experiments, we randomize the voltage comparisons using the software of C 
programming. In the next chip design, the LFSR and seed will be integrated on the chip. 
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 5.1 Differential-Power-Analysis Resistant VDC
Besides the problem of different sensitivities for the VDC in Fig.4.8, there still  exists 
another problem, which is its susceptibility to differential power attacks (DPA). DPA is a 
statistical  technique  that  is  used  to  steal  secrets  embedded  within  ICs.  It  works  by 
deducing internal states (and secrets) of the IC by analyzing power supply transistors that 
are generated from operating a functional unit, such as the Advanced Encryption Engine. 
The pulse-shrinking behavior of the VDC makes it relatively easy to determine the TC 
code for a given voltage difference measurement. The  power transient generated by the 
VDC simply stops when the pulse shrinks and disappears and therefore, the length of the 
power transient is proportional to the TC.
An architecture that addresses this issue is shown in Fig. 5.1. Here, the two GND 
PGVs  from  the  Mn and  Mn+1 metal  layers  drive  the  even-numbered  current  starved 
inverters within two identical delay chains, one shown along the top of the figure and one 
along the top delay chain ahead of the rising transition introduced into the lower delay 
chain.  Given that the Mn+1 voltage is  lower than the Mn voltage, the top delay chain 
propagates the edge more slowly, and eventually, the edge propagating along the bottom 
delay chain passes the top edges. Similar to the VDC in Fig. 4.8, as the edges propagate, 
each record a '1' in a latch as long as it precedes in time the edge on the other delay chain. 
Otherwise a '0' is stored. The duality of the delay chains causes complementary Tcs to be 
stored in the latches, which are subsequently transferred to the scan chain. An example 
test result is given in the center right of the figure which shows the complementary Tcs 
that are produced when the bottom edge passes the top edge at the 3rd latch.
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Although the  VDC architecture  is  almost  2  times  larger  in  area  than the  VDC 
shown in Fig.  4.8,  it  provides a  significant  advantage.  The power  transient  signature 
remains  constant  when  the  bottom  edge  passes  the  top  edge,  so  it  is  difficult  or 
impossible  for  an  adversary  to  determine  the  precise  time  at  which  this  occurred. 
Although some information is revealed at the end of the power transient that reflects the 
additional time taken by the top edge to propagate to the end of its delay chain relative to 
the  bottom edge,  it  requires  higher  signal-to-noise  ratios  when  analyzing  the  power 
transient  to  correlate  it  to  the  actual  PGV voltages.  Moreover,  it  is  possible  in  this 
architecture to introduce a 'stop condition' where the signal propagation is halted in the 
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Fig. 5.1: Proposed differential-Power-Analysis (DPA) resistance VDC.
top delay chain, effectively eliminating this type of information leakage. For example, by 
gating the VDD inputs on the top delay chain, it is possible to turn these inputs off at the  
instant the bottom edge propagates off the end of its delay chain. This action halts the 
propagation  along  the  top  scan  chain  (and  the  corresponding  power  transient)  and 
therefore 'hides' the difference in their delays.
 5.2 An Improved Version of PG-PUF
An  improved  version  of  PG-PUF  for  a  new  chip  will  be  designed,  which  will  be 
submitted for fabrication at MOSIS in 130 nm technology. The power-grid in the new 
chip will be designed using minimum size metal and single via as a means of increasing 
the magnitude of the resistance variations and voltage drops and rises. 
In the PG-PUF design for the new chip, we will still use the same SMC structure as 
in 90 nm technology. The main improvement of the new version PG-PUF is that we will 
integrate some analog and digital components required in an IP-block implementing a 
complete PUF system into the chip. These components will be added to next to SMC 
arrays as shown on the right side of Fig. 5.2. 
The  Digital  Challenge  Generator  generates  the  scan  chain  configuration  bits  to 
enable SMC shorting inverters and voltage sense connections in one or more SMCs.  The 
voltage sense wires are routed to the Voltage Comparator and Perturbation unit, which 
incorporates the analog-to-digital bit converter and bit stability  control. The PUF Engine 
serves  to  coordinate  the  activities  of  the  PUF IP-block  components  and  acts  as  the 
interface to high level applications which request PUF signature bits.
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       The proposed Voltage Comparator and Perturbation unit  is shown in Fig.5.3. It 
consist of an OpAmp array that compares two sense wire voltages on PS1 and PS2 as 
shown or on NS1 and NS2. The outputs of OpAmps are a a digital '1' if PS1>PS2, or '0' 
otherwise. The individual bits from each of the OpAmps in the array are collected in scan 
FFs and compared using a 'voting scheme' (not shown). The voter tallies up the responses 
and  decides  if  the  comparison generates  a  '1'  or  '0'  PUF signature  bit.  The  array  of 
OpAmps and the voting scheme are designed to reduce the adverse effect of biasing 
offsets in the OpAmps themselves. 
A critical component of (any) PUF system is a scheme to distinguish between 
stable and unstable bits. The voting scheme described above can be used to evaluate bit 
stability. For example, the voter may decide that the bit is unstable of the number of '1's 
produced by the OpAmp array is not larger by margin than the number of '0's, or vice 
versa.  A second,  complimentary  scheme is  shown in  Fig.  5.3.  A set  of  perturbation 
transistors are added to each SMC, that function to introduce a small dynamic voltage 
perturbation,  either  on  the  power  grid  as  shown  or  on  the  voltage  sense  wires 
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Fig. 5.2: PUF IP-block (blue circles represent SMC arrays).
themselves. The voltage variations introduced will cause the output of selected OpAmp 
to flip between '0' and '1' in cases where the voltages being compared are very similar. 
The glitch detector shown in the lower right of the figure is designed to detect the bit flip 
using an XOR gate and an SR-latch. The 'stability-indicator' output of the SR-latch will  
remain a '0' if the bit is stable and '1' otherwise.
                                       
      
  
        
       The PUF engine collects the sequence of bits generated, partitioning the bit string 
into stable and unstable bits based on the stability evaluator(s). The stable bits represent 
the 'repeatedly random' group and can be used for authentication and encryption keys, 
while the second group is not repeatable and can be used for one-time pads and other 
applications that require a true random number. We plan to build the entire PUF system 
on a custom ASIC for experimental evaluation. 
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Fig. 5.3: Voltage Comparator and Perturbation circuit 
               for on-chip bit stability evaluation.
Chapter 6 
Conclusion
              
Two implementations  of a PUF based on the resistance variations of metal  wires  are 
presented. Experiments are carried out on two sets of chips, one set fabricated in IBM's 
65 nm SOI technology and another  fabricated in  IBM's  90 nm bulk technology.  The 
results  show that metal  resistance variations  that occur  in  the  power grid are able to 
produce bit strings that perform well under HD and NIST statistical tests. Both of these 
two implementations are shown to generate cryptographic quality bit strings of length up 
to 1.6M bits. Experiments are also carried out across different temperatures and voltages 
in order to evaluate the stability of PG-PUFs in 90 nm technology. 
In  Chapter  1,  I  described  the  importance  of  exploiting  PUFs  for  security 
applications and introduced the advantages of PG-PUFs which leverage the resistance 
variations of the power grid of chips.
In  Chapter  2,  I  briefly  introduced  the  development  of  concepts  of  PUFs,  and 
introduced the  extensions  of  PUFs;  Also,  I  listed  several  popular  PUFs published in 
recent years and described the applications of PUFs. Finally, I gave some methods of 
evaluating the quality of PUFs and ways of improving the stability of PUFs.
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In  Chapter  3,  I  proposed  two  primitives  of  PG-PUFs.  One  is  based  on  the 
technology of 65 nm. The PG-PUF for this technology can only measure the voltage from 
one metal layers. In order to increase the entropy and size of the bitstrings generated from 
our PG-PUFs, I proposed another primitive based on the 90 nm technology, which can 
measure the voltage from 8 metal layers of the power grid.  By this way, the voltage 
difference  between two consecutive  metal  layer,  which  can  eliminate  the  bias  of  the 
power  grid,  can  also  be  compared.  The  statistical  results  indicate  both  of  these  two 
primitives can produce cryptographic quality bit strings of significant length.
In Chapter 4, I applied different environmental parameters to the PG-PUFs of 90 
nm technology in order to evaluate the stability of them. In the experiments, I used the 
temperature of -40oC, 25oC, 85oC and the +/-10% of the nominal  supply voltage and 
combine them into 9 TV corners. And then I carried out a series of measurements across 
these 9 TV corners. The statistical results show that the bitstrings generated from the PG-
PUFs can still be used for cryptographic applications during different environment.
In chapter 5, I described the many facets of future work. I found some problems 
existing in the present VDC circuit structure: one is its susceptibility to DPA; another one 
is  the  different  sensitivities  that  exist  for  Cal0  and  Cal1.  Therefore,  I  proposed  a 
complementary VDC structure which can fix both of these two problems. I also proposed 
an improved PG-PUF structure for the next version chip design. In the new power grid 
structure, the minimum size of metals will be used, which will be expected to have larger 
manufacture variations and increase entropy. Finally, I presented my idea of integrating 
the LFSR and seed on to the next chip design.
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